Catholic Theological Union

KAUNALA TAPE

Towards a theological reflection on a
New Guinea initiation myth

M.A. Thesis submitted by
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1978
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my thanks to all those who helped make this study possible. Firstly I wish to thank many people at Catholic Theological Union in Chicago, especially teachers, Fr. Robert Schreiter C.P.P.S, Fr. Thomas More Newbold C.P., and Rev. Claude-Marie Barbour, and fellow students in the Melanesian Theology Workgroup, Fr. Francis Misso MSC, Sr. Wendy Flannery R.S.M. and Mr. Alan Foley.

Without Kale who chanted the myth of Kaunala Tape, and Nandewa who transcribed and translated it, this study would have been impossible.

My grateful thanks also to Fr. Tony Somhorst S.V.D., a companion and enthusiastic friend while I was in Porgera, Papua New Guinea, and also to Ms. Aletta Biersack whose scholarly insights into Ipili culture have helped me greatly.

I am grateful also to my community and the staff at St. James Parish for their support and patience during the months I was preparing this work.

Finally I wish to thank Mrs. Nancy Ahner for her work in typing the final manuscript.

April 10, 1978

Philip Gibbs
INTRODUCTION

In his recent book *Stories of God*, John Shea tells about an initiation rite among the Hopi indians of Arizona. The rite centers around the *kachinas*, masked gods who visit the village. During the initiation the *kachinas* tell special stories to the young people, dance to entertain them and frighten them with their ugly masks. At the climax of the ceremony the young people are taken to a hut and the *kachinas* surprise them by entering without masks. The initiates discover that the *kachinas* are really members of their own village impersonating the gods. This experience of disenchantment is the beginning of new religious consciousness. The unmasking shatters their previous faith that the masked dancers were really the Hopi gods and pushes the initiates to a profound religious question. With their new knowledge, should the *kachinas* be left behind with childhood, or can they be appropriated in a new way in their later life? To respond positively to the question is to perceive the dancers as symbols of the sacred and to understand that the sacred extends far beyond its human manifestations.

Similar questions are faced by religious people throughout the world. Catholics, especially in the Western world, have experienced disenchantment with the changes of the tendency in the Church to merge symbols of sacrality with the Sacred itself. Confronted with new and predominantly Western understandings, men and women in new Christian churches of the non-Western world, especially the young people, have been faced with the question in relation to their ancestral beliefs. Schooled in science and history, they question the place of the myths of their parents. The question is very real for the Western missionary. Where he or she is unable to see beyond the masks, culture is perceived as idolatrous. But where he or she sees the masks as mediators of the Sacred, culture may be perceived as the medium by which God speaks to humankind, and myths, freed of the burden of being treated as science and history, may illumine new areas of understanding.
The question of the appropriation of mythic material lies behind this thesis. The primary audience to which it is addressed is firstly myself and secondly my fellow missionaries. The usefulness of the insights here for non-Western people in local churches is something for themselves to determine. I commence this study with questions addressed to myself, such as the following. What attitude can I as a Westerner take to mytho-symbolic material? How can I come to understand myth in a way fruitful for theological understandings? What can tribal myths say to the Christian theological tradition?

The questions I ask are not uniquely my own. Such questioning is at the basis of emerging forms of theology known variously as ethnotechnology, incarnational theology, contextual theology, and local theology.¹ I will use the latter term for a theology which respects the unique cultural and faith experience of a "local" church. The movement toward developing local theologies comes out of a disenchantment with prevailing forms of Western theology and a belief that there can be "unity in diversity."² It comes out of a growing realization that if the gospel is to be truly incarnate in various cultures, it must speak to values, meanings and experiences which are uniquely part of those cultures.

Developing local theologies begins with a respect for the importance of culture. Too often in the past, culture and cultural forms have been treated as factors extrinsic to the Gospel; as historical contingencies within which the gospel message finds its context; as factors which can be separated from any appearance of the Gospel in a situation. The Gospel does not present itself as a kernel of truth easily separated from a contextual husk.³ The notion of the Incarnation tells us that they are always given together and have to be read and understood that way. Rather than treating culture and cultural influence as a factor to be eliminated, it must be accepted as a given and used to advantage. One must begin with culture and the meanings within it which provide the basis for its unique configuration.

Beginning with culture means using insights from the science of culture: anthropology. In Chapter I, I will outline some anthropological theories of culture, especially those theories which give special attention to meaning and the ways meaning is communicated within culture.
Local theology, while utilizing anthropological insights, necessarily transcends the empirical world of anthropological inquiry. In Chapter II, I will move to a more philosophical level with Paul Ricoeur: his critique of structural anthropology and his proposed hermeneutic of texts. Ricoeur's hermeneutic moves from a naive precritical appreciation (like the initial attitude of the Hopi youths to the kachinas) to a "depth" interpretation resulting from critical reflection.

Local theology, ideally, should take the whole of culture into account, but my study will focus on one important element of culture, that of myth. Myths are important because they reflect a people's understanding of themselves. As Shea says, "In telling stories . . . we ourselves are told." Myth-making "creates world by structuring consciousness, encouraging attitudes, and suggesting behaviors." In a number of instances myths are vehicles by which people attempt to deal coherently with the experience of culture contact. In Chapter III, I will study a myth from Papua New Guinea: "The Myth of Kaunala Tape." Using insights from various anthropologists, especially Claude Lévi-Strauss, I will look for meanings within the myth and for the meaning of the myth itself.

In Chapter IV, I will begin a dialogue between the myth that I have analyzed and a part of the Christian scriptural tradition in an attempt to find how the myth can relate to theology. Hopefully a comparison and contrast at the deep level of the previous analysis of the myth will open up new directions for thought in the scriptural passage (Genesis 1-4) and in turn reveal new meanings in the myth itself.

The outcome of this dialogue may be different from the theological expressions commonly found in the West today. Theological form reflects cultural form, and the systematic, analytic theology of the West reflects in a significant degree a highly differentiated and technologically based culture. Melanesian culture may find expression in a theological style which makes greater use of symbol, allegory and analogy, and which respects oral traditions and their forms. This will become more apparent by the end of the thesis.
CHAPTER I
THE CULTURAL DIMENSION

Introduction

Religious beliefs and practices are an important part of every culture as human beings try to come to terms with the forces that lie "beyond the light of their campfires": with the powers of the universe that lie beyond themselves. Lack of a specific category of the "religious" in a culture may be indicative not of an absence of religious beliefs and practices, but rather of their all pervasive nature. Myths happen when such ideas and beliefs are incorporated in a narrative of events and couched in a unique dramatic symbolic form of a sacred quality which differentiates them from other narratives such as the telling of history.¹

Since myth is a function of culture, one's attitude to myths is determined to a large extent by one's cultural hermeneutic. So I will present a short survey of different attitudes which I consider relevant to a contemporary understanding of culture and to its religious dimension, especially the mythological. I will begin with a historical survey of anthropological approaches, and then consider the more contemporary ideas of Turner, Geertz and Claude Lévi-Strauss.

Traditional Approaches

The roots of current attitudes to culture lie back in the nineteenth century, when to think systematically about culture was to think historically according to evolutionary principles. Lewis Henry Morgan's developmental theme in his Ancient Society (1877) envisioned the history of culture as consisting of three major "ethical periods": Savagery, Barbarism, and Civilization. Others, like Spencer and Tylor, followed similar schemes. Tylor applied this same method to the religious dimension of culture. A central theme of his Primitive Culture (1871) is the evolution of the concept of Animism, Tylor's minimum definition of
religion, from amoral belief in spirits towards moral monotheism. Mythology was an important source of data for these theorists, who tended to read myths literally and consequently to view them as a form of defective reasoning. For Tylor, myths were the means used by primitive peoples to personalize and so understand and control the forces of the natural world. For James Frazer, also an evolutionist, myths were primitive people's misguided and unscientific attempts at explaining social and cosmic phenomena.

There were reactions to the evolutionary approach, such as De Maistre's degenerationism, the Kulturkreislehre of Schmidt and the various proponents of diffusionism in the United States and England. The lasting result of this anti-historicist reaction has been static approaches to culture, which might broadly be divided into the psychological and sociological. I will consider these in turn.

Students of culture in the first half of this century reacted negatively to Freud's scheme of universal instinctual traits. They were concerned to show that culture has the power to make every human being different from what "nature" has decreed. Malinowski claimed to disprove the universality of the Oedipus complex among Trobriand Islanders, and Margaret Mead's first three field studies are also, in part, a critique of Freud. However on the subject of religion as a part of culture they were less critical of Freud's theory that religious beliefs and practices are homologous with neurotic symptoms and are, at best, an illusion. Reacting against the intellectual interpretations of the previous century, they tended to reduce magic and religion to psychological states: tensions, frustrations, emotions and sentiments, complexes or delusions of one sort or another. To Malinowski, religion was cathartic in the face of tension and anxiety. To Marrett and Lowie, it arose out of the awe and fear before the experience of cosmic forces. With the reaction against intellectualism, and the new focus on the observation of individual human behavior, mythology received less attention, and where considered, it too was reduced to psychological states. According to Ruth Benedict, myths often exemplify a kind of wish-fulfilment fantasy. Those who did take up the serious study of mythology were not really students of culture as such, but historians of religion (Eliade) or analytic psychologists (Jung).
Emile Durkheim, an early proponent of the sociological approach set about discovering what holds the "social organism" (culture) together. This he attributed to the moral force of the collective consciousness of the human community. The importance of religion was its functional significance for maintaining and expressing the collective solidarity of the community. Myth and ritual represent and support values embodied in social life. British structural functionists have continued a similar reductionist view of religion. For Radcliffe-Brown, the sanctity of religious things derived from their practical "social" importance. For Malinowski, the function of myth lay in its justificatory message: sanctioning clan rights, affirming territorial rights or giving authenticity to magical practices. Cohen, commenting on this reductionism says, "Malinowski doubted that the Trobrianders were interested in explanation as such; nor did he see them as symbolists. In fact, his Trobrianders were almost as positivistic as he was. They have become less so at the hands of his successors."4

Current thinking on culture, religion and mythology is a reaction to and a development from that outlined above. Strictly positivistic approaches, which tend to be reductionist, have changed with a new appreciation of less observable features of culture.5 This has brought a renewed interest in religious beliefs and values and in myths as an important aspect of these beliefs and values looked at in their own right, not just in terms of the social structure. The organismic analogy of functionalism has given way to a linguistic analogy, which along with psychology, has allowed Lévi-Strauss to reach beyond Durkheim to hidden structures of the mind causally prior to collective representations. Objects are seen to be sacred, not because they are "good to eat" (Radcliffe-Brown) but because they are "good to think" (Lévi-Strauss). Accompanying these changes is a developing interest in going beyond the function of cultural features to their "meaning." This has meant new attention to the analysis and interpretation of religious meanings and symbols, and of myth as a symbolic mode of discourse. The new developments have been criticized as a reversion to idealism6 and for not changing radically enough,7 but I find that they reveal a richer appreciation of culture, symbol and myth, and it will be my purpose through the rest of this chapter to describe them more fully.8
Symbol and Ritual

Victor Turner is one whose studies of ritual behavior have led him to study symbolic action and ritual symbols. From Kluckhohn and Van Gennep he learned that there is more to myth and ritual than what the actors say or what one can observe on the surface. He distinguishes three levels of meaning: the exegetical, operational, and positional; ranging from the indigenous explanation to the functional and to a structural interpretation. Symbols may be found at any of these levels, a symbol being the "ultimate unit of structure in a ritual context," the "molecules of ritual," something standing for something other than itself. By starting with symbol as a basic building block of ritual, his method is the reverse of most previous scholars who begin with cosmology expressing mythological cycles and then explain rituals as expressing structural models found in the myths. Turner finds this traditional approach too static and insufficient for dealing with symbolic action as drama which sustains processes involving temporal changes in social relations. He states his purpose as follows:

What I have been doing ... is trying to provide an alternative notion to that of those anthropologists who still work, despite explicit denials, with the paradigm of Radcliffe-Brown and regard religious symbols as reflecting or expressing social structure and promoting social integration. My view would also differ from that of certain anthropologists who would regard religion as akin to a neurotic symptom or a cultural defense mechanism. Both these approaches treat symbolic behavior, symbolic actions, as an "epiphenomenon," while I try to give it "ontological" status.

An indication of their ontological status is the way symbols (especially what he terms "dominant symbols") instigate social action. "Groups mobilize around them, worship before them, perform other symbolic activities near them and add other symbolic objects to them ...." Symbols "work" through their multivocal nature by condensing several references, and uniting them in a single cognitive and affective field.

In Turner's view the referents tend to polarize between an "oerctic pole" (physiological phenomena, e.g., blood, sexual organs) and an "ideological pole" (normative values, e.g., reciprocity, respect). Under the right conditions and in the drama of ritual action (e.g., dancing, feasting) there may be an exchange between these poles "in which
biological referents are ennobled and the normative referents are charged with emotional significance."14 This brings about a cathartic effect creating a milieu in which a society's members cannot see any fundamental conflict between themselves as individuals and themselves in society, and in some cases causes real transformations of character and of social relationships. "People are induced to want to do what they must do."15 The right conditions for this are periods of "liminality," on the peripheries of everyday life or in times of transition. Under such non-institutional conditions, people are united in bonds of "communitas" (undifferentiated, egalitarian, nonrational, I-Thou relationships) and the structural impoverishment gives way to symbolic enrichment.

Turner treats myth similarly, as a liminal phenomenon, frequently told at a time or in a site that is "betwixt and between." Myths treat of origins but derive from transitions: relating how one state of affairs became another, "how an unpeopled world became populated; how chaos became cosmos; how immortals became mortal . . ."16 In the potency of liminality the myth offers a symbolic freedom of action which is denied in normal life.

Turner's main contribution to cultural studies is in his offering an alternative to "structure," especially the conscious observable structure of the British structural functionalists, or, as Turner defines it, the system of status's and roles in society. His alternative of anti-structure (communitas) represents the unbound, dynamic dimension of the social. Thus social science need not examine the way certain symbols found in myth, ritual and literature reflect or express structure. "Symbols may well reflect not structure, but anti-structure and not only reflect it but contribute to creating it."17 This generative aspect is complementary to the structural. "Man is both structural and an anti-structural entity, who grows through anti-structure and conserves through structure."18

Semiotic Approaches

Clifford Geertz offers a view of ritual behavior and symbolic action not unlike that of Turner. He too wants to go beyond those whose method involves, "turning culture into folklore and collecting it, turning it into traits and counting it, turning it into institutions and classifying
it, turning it into structures and toying with it.\textsuperscript{19} Unlike Turner who classifies and looks for meaning of symbols within ritual and the wider culture, Geertz prefers to see culture itself as an "ordered system of meaning and of symbols,"\textsuperscript{20} and the study of culture as an interpretive science in search of meaning. Systems of "significant symbols"\textsuperscript{21} act as "webs of significance" or culture patterns and culture may be seen as the accumulated totality of such patterns.

The "semiotic" (from semion = sign) approach to culture is based on a communications systems metaphor and treats culture as a vast network of interrelated meanings.\textsuperscript{22} One of the more lucid explanations of this approach comes from Leach in his small volume Culture and Communication. The "message" in any communication event is communicated by means of an "index" (signal, sign symbol; which, depending upon how it is used). One may understand the information conveyed if one knows the correct "code." A verbal example would be the sentence: "The Lamb of God takes away our sins." The message (meaning) is communicated by means of various linguistic indices (words), coded according to the rules of English syntax. The word "Lamb" illustrates different possible usages of words which will be important in later chapters. Taken according to conventional usage, the word is a sign for an animal. But used as metaphor (symbolically) it refers to the person of Jesus. The same semiotic structure may operate in all the various non-verbal modes of culture such as cooking (wedding cakes), food (caviar for breakfast!), music (appropriate or not), color (red = danger), clothing (significance of various uniforms), etc., which are organized in patterned sets so as to incorporate coded information in a way analogous to the sounds and words and sentences of a natural language. "... it is just as meaningful to talk about the grammatical rules which govern the wearing of clothes as it is to talk about the grammatical rules which govern speech utterances."\textsuperscript{23} Each code is potentially a transformation of any other in the same sense as a written text is a transformation of speech, thus, for instance, ritual and myth may present the same message but in different codes. The transformation of codes and the terminology of semiotics will be put to use especially in Chapter III.

Geertz develops this approach for a "thick" (interpretive) description of culture. It is more than deciphering established codes; more
like penetrating a literary text where "the anthropologist strains to read over the shoulders of those to whom they properly belong." The work is always one of interpretation, "trying to rescue the 'said' [meaning]" of the social discourse of human behavior as symbolic action. "The whole point of a semiotic approach to culture is...to aid us in gaining access to the conceptual world in which our subjects live so that we can, in some extended sense of the term, converse with them." Seeing the task as one of interpretation helps keep Geertz from the "cognitivist fallacy" which locates culture "in the minds and hearts of men," investigating "what the 'natives' really think." Anthropological writings are almost always second and third order interpretations and must be acknowledged as such. Moreover he insists that conceptual structures must never be divorced from the flow of behavior. Human thought is social. "Whatever, or whenever symbol systems 'in their own terms' may be, we gain empirical access to them by inspecting events, not by arranging abstract entities into unified patterns." For instance, in his description of a Balinese cockfight which he interprets as "a Balinese reading of Balinese experience, a story they tell themselves about themselves," he tries to keep the analysis of the drama and metaphor tied as closely as possible to the text: the collectively sustained symbolic structure of the social events: village relations, ownership of cocks, the betting, and the emotions involved.

Unlike Turner, Geertz still deals exclusively with "structure," but his genius is in his ability to find a path which takes account of ideational factors without succumbing to materialist or idealist forms of reductionism. Ideas, concepts, metaphors and meanings are not shadows cast by the organization of society or part of the "soul" of history; rather they are independent but not self-sufficient forces having their impact in the social sphere. Only having kept the analysis close to the logic of actual life can one then, through interpretation, discover conceptual structures in what he calls "paradigmatic human events." "To look at the symbolic dimensions of social action--art, religion, ideology, science, law, morality, common sense--is not to turn away from the existential dilemmas of life for some empyrean realm of de-emotionalized forms; it is to plunge into the midst of them."
Structuralism

Clifford Geertz's criticism of those whose "de-emotionalized forms" are divorced from the flow of behavior, is aimed at French structuralists, primarily Claude Lévi-Strauss. Geertz is not impressed by those who would claim to understand people without knowing them. Lévi-Strauss who, as he says himself in Tristes Tropiques, came to know native peoples no closer than "an image seen in a looking glass," claims that it is possible to construct a theoretical model of society which, though it does not correspond to any that can be found in reality, will nonetheless help towards understanding society and human nature. One understands then, not by plunging in, but by standing back and at a deeper level intellectually reconstituting the universals of human thought. Lévi-Strauss has had a broad impact on anthropological theory in general and the study of myth in particular. In what follows I will attempt to outline his approach to culture especially in the analysis of myth. This is difficult, for as Cohen says, "the trouble with trying to state Lévi-Strauss's theory of myth is that he has never fully stated it himself."

Lévi-Strauss's theory is based upon a linguistic model, especially developments in phonological theory, so it is this to which I will now turn.

Linguistic Background

Lévi-Strauss himself refers back to Saussure's Cours de linguistique générale (1916): a seminal work for structural linguistics. Saussure's three most important points, which were to have a formative influence in the development of linguistic thought are: the distinction between synchronic and diachronic; the distinction between langue and parole; and the idea of language as a system of signs.

Synchronic linguistics sees language as a whole, existing as a state at a particular point in time. Saussure uses the analogy of a chess game. It is possible to assess the state of the game at any particular time by simply observing the position of the pieces on the board. One does not need to know the previous moves. Diachronic linguistics studies material historically: the changes in language over time. The result of this distinction was to give greater importance to living language.
Saussure envisaged language to be composed of two aspects: *langue* (the language system) and *parole* (the act of speaking). *Langue* is a corporate phenomenon valid for all speakers: the sum of all the word images stored in the minds of individuals. *Parole* is the object available for the direct observation of the linguist: the personal act of speaking at any particular time and place.\(^{33}\)

Saussure clarified the concept of the language "system." *Langue* is a system of "signs" (the linguistic sign being a relational construct of "signifier" (sound-image) and "signified" (concept). A sentence is a sequence of such signs, each sign contributing something to the meaning of the whole and each contrasting with all other signs in the language. The sequence is in a "syntagmatic" relationship.\(^{34}\) But in addition there are associative or "paradigmatic" relationships which are relationships between a sign in a sentence and one not present, but part of the rest of the language. One can choose from a paradigmatic set (e.g., he, she, it, etc.) which sign to use at any place in the syntagmatic structure. Meaning arises out of relationships between signs in a system, not out of the signs as such. For instance the meaning of "he" may be found by a process of elimination (not I, you, she, it, we or they). Thus Saussure's principle: "In language there are only differences."

It is this subject of differences which became very influential in Jakobson's structural phonology. Each phoneme--the smallest unit of language to carry meaning--is defined in terms of "distinctive features" which stand in clear opposition to other features. Thus abstract phonemes are defined not by any inherent quality, but by opposition or contrast. Elements devoid of meaning become meaningful in their differences. Jakobson claims that young children come to generate meaningful noise patterns by gaining control of the basic oppositions between vowel and consonant, then oppositions within these two groups and so on. These binary oppositions become internalized into the child's computerlike mental processes.\(^{36}\)

I have dealt with these linguistic developments in some detail because they are important as a basis for Lévi-Strauss's ideas of societal processes. The distinctions: synchronic/diachronic, *langue*/*parole*, *syntagmatic*/paradigmatic* will recur in the further discussion of his work.
He believes that economic exchange, kinship exchange and myth are modes of communication similar to language. Just as phonemes are meaningless in isolation and only take on significance in combination with other phonemes, so the elements in myth for instance, only take on significance through relations with each other. Phonemes are abstract forms and it is this structure underlying the phonetic surface which gives language significance as a means of communication. Similarly the "meaning" of a myth is found in its underlying structural relations. Moreover by demonstrating that the underlying structures as communication schemes are isomorphic, or mutually derivable, one may move between different levels of social reality.

From words the linguist extracts the phonetic reality of the phonemes; and from the phoneme he extracts the logical reality of distinctive features. And when he has found in several languages the same phonemes or the use of the same pairs of oppositions, he does not compare individually distinct entities. It is the same phoneme, the same element... We are not dealing with two similar phonemena, but with one and the same... --it is necessary and sufficient to grasp the unconscious structure underlying each institution and each custom, in order to obtain a principle of interpretation valid for other institutions and other customs, provided of course that the analysis is carried far enough.37

**Concrete Thought**

In *La Pensée sauvage* Lévi-Strauss enters into an analysis of "savage" thought, proposing that it is a science of the concrete which utilizes the directly sensed realities found in nature. Savage thought exists on the level of signs, which (according to Saussure) are intermediary between images and concepts. "Signs resemble images in being concrete entities but they resemble concepts in their powers of reference."38 Lévi-Strauss uses the example of a "bricoleur" to illustrate the difference. A "bricoleur" (like a handyman) does not construct things from raw materials and with tools for the purpose of the project. He makes do with whatever is at hand, constructing objects from finite and heterogenous odds and ends. Mythical thought on an intellectual plane is like "bricolage" on a technical plane.39 Whereas abstract concepts are free (theoretically) to have unlimited relations with other entities of the same kind, signs are "constrained" by the fact that they already possess a sense; but are "permutable"; capable of standing in successive relations...
with a limited number of other entities. "Thus mythical thought can generalize by analogies and comparisons even though its creations, like those of the "bricoleur" always really consist of a new arrangement of elements." He uses the kaleidoscope to illustrate the logic of this operation. The chips in a kaleidoscope can fall in a variety of patterns while remaining unchanged in quantity, form or color. The pattern consists, not so much in the individual properties of the chips, as in the relationship among them. Mythical thought is a matter of shuffling discrete and concrete images: totem animals, sacred colors, etc., building up structured sets by "the remains and debris of events." This process is not a conscious one. He claims to show "not how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact."

Like the mind, which is considered to work through a process of binary discriminations (N.B. Jakobson's "distinctive features"), what is important is not any specific characteristics of images, but the contrast between any pair of them. For instance, totemism does not postulate any strange connections between social groups and animal species. Rather, a system of natural discriminations is being used as a coding device to make statements of social significance. It is the differences and not the similarities which resemble one another. Lévi-Strauss thinks that any classificatory scheme can be exposed by binary logic and once the code is revealed it should be possible to state its code in another language. Thus one may move between different levels of reality (e.g., totems and social groupings) by demonstrating that their logical structures are mutually derivable from each other. Meaning is derived from these logical structures; the meaning of myth for instance being found in the unconscious underlying structures which can be abstracted and expressed algebraically.

Analogous Logic

Transformations are possible between different levels of logical structures by the use of analogous logic based on laws of association. There are two types of relation; metaphor: relying on recognition of similarity, and metonym: implying contiguity. For example: to say "The Lamb of God" is to use metaphor if one is using it in a sense which
recognizes some similarity between a lamb and Jesus. But to speak of "the Crown" in the sense of sovereignty is to use metonym; calling upon the uniquely contiguous association between a sovereign and his or her uniform of office.

Lévi-Strauss uses these laws of association in his explanation of totemism as I have indicated above. However he makes greater use of the metaphor/metonym distinction in his analysis of mythical systems. In this regard he uses the expressions "syntagmatic chain" and "paradigmatic series"; the meaning of which was explained in a previous section. He gives an example from music to illustrate the way these function. The association of sounds in harmony (an orchestral score read vertically) is metaphoric. The notes belong to the system of sounds which can be made by all the assembled instruments. The association of sounds in a melodic sequence (a score read across the page) is metonymic.

The important point about the analysis of mythical thought is not just that paradigmatic association and syntagmatic chains are combined, but that "meaning" depends on "transformations" from one mode to the other. Leach illustrates this well with two figures as follows:

(a) Mythical story as recorded  Syntagmatic chain
    
    | Episode A | Episode B | Episode C |
    |           |           |           |

(b) Episode A  Episodes arranged in paradigmatic form
    Episode B
    Episode C

(c) Summary result obtained by "addition."

Fig. 1. Paradigmatic and Syntagmatic Transformations

The procedure involves a double transformation from the metonymic mode to the metaphoric and back to the metonymic. The elements of the additive story are abstract. It is a structural sequence which Lévi-Strauss in his unique style represents with an algebraic equation:46

\[ F_x : F_y(b) :: F_x(b) : F_{a-l}(y) \]

where \( x \) and \( y \) are functions, \( a \) and \( b \) are terms. \( a-l \) is the opposite of
a, fa-ly is the end product of the process of mediation. b is alternately specified by both functions and thus can mediate opposites.

Myth Analysis

In his paper "The Structural Study of Myth" (1955), Lévi-Strauss sets out the procedure for analyzing a myth. His later four-volumed Mythologiques (1964-71) develops into a study of the syntax of American mythology. I find the ingenuity of his structuralist technique helpful on limited bodies of material, but I, like Leach, find the web of 813 stories of his comparative survey of the mythology of the Americas to be somewhat like a "latter-day Golden Bough." So I will focus on the first paper and on a later one: La Geste d'Asidiwal (1958). Lévi-Strauss himself advises that one broaden the study only after the analysis of one initial myth.

Lévi-Strauss compares myth to language. Language exists on two levels, langue and parole, distinguished by the different time referents they use. Myth, which is language functioning "on an especially high level," uses a third referent which combines the properties of the first two; it explains the past and the present as well as the future. Myth, like the rest of language is made up of "constituent units" (like phonemes, morphemes, etc.), and the first task in analyzing a myth is to identify and isolate the gross constituent units which he terms "mythemes," which are found on the sentence level. Each unit consists of "bundles of relations." By reorganizing the myth paradigmatically according to these bundles of relations, one reorganizes the myth according to a time referent which is simultaneously diachronic and synchronic, integrating the characteristics of langue and parole. He gives the example of a sequence of the type: 1,2,4,7,8,2,3,4,6,8,1,4,5,7,8,1,2,5,7,3,4,5,6,8, being arranged as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
1 & 2 & 4 & 7 & 8 \\
2 & 3 & 4 & 6 & 8 \\
1 & 4 & 5 & 7 & 8 \\
1 & 2 & 5 & 7 \\
3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 8 \\
\end{array}
\]

Having set out the myth and its variants systematically in this way one may "perceive some basic logical processes which are at the root of mythical thought."
In order to discover these basic logical processes, one may look for oppositions and mediations; also inversions and paradoxes. Lévi-Strauss claims that the main function of myth is to mediate contradictions and oppositions found in culture. Thus "mythical thought always progressed from the awareness of oppositions toward their resolution . . . two opposite terms with no intermediary always tend to be replaced by two equivalent terms which admit of a third one as mediator; then one of the polar terms and the mediator become replaced by a new triad, and so on." In inversions there may be an exchange of functions; for example something first formulated in terms of a space referent, being conceived in terms of a time referent. In paradoxes, the same figure may be endowed with contradictory attributes (e.g., good and bad at the same time).

The adventures of the hero in La Geste d'Asdiwal, a myth from the Tsimshian indians of British Columbia, are seen as a "series of impossible mediations between oppositions which are ordered in a descending scale: high and low, water and earth, sea-hunting and mountain-hunting, etc." Sometimes there is a complementarity in these codes, for instance the opposition peak/valley is "vertical" in form and "geographical" in content. Lévi-Strauss isolates and compares various levels: geographic, economic, sociological and cosmological. All these codes share an underlying logical structure in which is encapsulated the formal expressions of the message. He has decided that the meaning, a negative truth, is found on the sociological level in setting forth the dilemma: the tension between residence and property rights, which marriage with a matrilateral cousin attempts but fails to resolve. Just how this is the "meaning" of the myth and how he arrives at it is not entirely clear. Lévi-Strauss says that "Anthropology aims to be a semiological [sic] science, and takes as a guiding principle that of 'meaning.'" But is this a meaning of content or of structure? Several commentators have pointed out that his theory of meaning resting upon non-meaning; of the human mind creating significance out of the structure of elements devoid of meaning in themselves is not totally borne out in his practice. One look at the minute details of his analysis indicates that. Perhaps it is more correct, as Lévi-Strauss says elsewhere, that form must take precedence over the content, that it is the deep-level arrangement of the contents
which is important, allowing the underlying message of the myth to be conveyed by the structural relations.

**Criticism**

Though most anthropologists agree on the importance of Lévi-Strauss's contribution, they disagree with aspects of approach and details of his argument. Some dislike his vagueness; others, his underlying philosophy. Geertz charges him with Rousseauian moralism in his setting "King Reason back upon his throne in the guise of the Cerebral Savage." Other commentators, less colorful than Geertz, question whether a binary theory of the human mind is capable of registering the subtleties of human thought, especially symbol and metaphor. Leach points out that,

The linguistic model which Lévi-Strauss employs is now largely out of date. Present-day theoreticians in the field of structural linguistics have come to recognize that the deep-level process of pattern generation and pattern recognition that is entailed by the human capacity to attach complex semantic significance to speech utterance must depend on mechanisms of much greater complexity than is suggested by the digital computer model which underlies the Jakobson-Lévi-Strauss theories.

Chomsky has argued against finite-state models and with him the emphasis in linguistics has changed from taxonomic concerns to investigation of rule complexes in the area of logico-semantics.

Paul Ricoeur has questioned whether Lévi-Strauss's taking examples from geographical areas of totemism and not Semitic, pre-Hellenic or Indo-European areas, gives a bias towards a certain kind of thought type in which the arrangement of items of culture is more important and more stable than content.

Douglas questions whether Lévi-Strauss's system of transformations is not an instrument which is too powerful. "To the English anthropologist some of this symmetry and inversion seems rather far-fetched." Pointing to the significance of social detail in the "Tale of Asdiwal" she says that "we are being asked to suspend our critical faculties if we are to believe that this myth mirrors the reverse of reality."

Kirk argues that if the myth-language is valid, then myths will convey messages distinct from structure because language does not convey
meaning by syntax. This goes to the heart of Lévi-Strauss's use of semiotics, and it is not always clear whether Lévi-Strauss regards mythic material as texts to interpret or ciphers to solve. His purposes seem to vary. Though Lévi-Strauss himself claims to follow Saussurian (semiological) principles, Sperber points out that mythical thought as "bricolage," using elements that have already been used and so have acquired meaning, does not follow Saussure's basic notion of the arbitrariness of the "sign." Sperber says that Lévi-Strauss has proposed the first elaborate alternative to semiology because his approach is at base cognitive and interpretive. Yet Lévi-Strauss limits himself by his rationalist method, for the whole point of symbolism is that it has partly escaped the conceptual code. Something is symbolic precisely to the extent that it is not entirely explicable. "Lévi-Strauss revealed as never before, the universality of focalisation and the universal elements of the evocational field in cultural symbolism. But, wishing to explain his own discoveries in semiological terms, he has on the contrary, rendered them incomprehensible." This will be taken up in the following chapter in relation to Ricoeur's critique.

**Conclusion**

I have given an outline of the work of three modern writers in the area of symbol and myth in culture. All three give a priority to meaning in culture, though they differ as to where it is found. All three study myth in its own right as an important and indispensable part of culture. The differences lie in: (1) how they perceive meaning; (2) the logic by which it is revealed; (3) the aspects of culture which they focus upon.

(1) Turner distinguishes three levels of meaning: the exegetical, operational, and positional; ranging from the indigenous explanation to the functional and to a structural interpretation. Geertz looks for meaning not in specific symbols like Turner, but in the flow of social discourse which he perceives as symbolic. Lévi-Strauss looks for meaning in the abstract logic of structural relations.

(2) Turner posits indeterminateness as an intrinsic characteristic of symbolism. Geertz finds order in the logic of actual life.
Lévi-Strauss goes to great lengths to describe the analogical concrete logic of mythical thought.

(3) Turner's focus is directed mainly to liminal rituals. Geertz looks more to the whole of social events in culture. Lévi-Strauss perceives structure in all levels of social reality.

Geertz is critical of Lévi-Strauss and the abstractness of his "experimental mind reading."71 Turner is less critical, in fact he likens his "communitas" to a Lévi-Straussian structure, a way of inscribing in the mentalities of neophytes generative rules, codes, and media whereby they can manipulate the symbols of speech and culture to confer some degree of intelligibility on an experience that perceptually outstrips the possibilities of linguistic . . . expression. Within this one can find what Lévi-Strauss would call "a concrete logic," and behind this again, a fundamental structure of human mentality or even of the human brain itself.72

A comparison of the differences reveals how each of the three authors makes his own unique contribution to the study of myth and meaning in culture: Turner, in his attention to symbol and in the idea of anti-structure; Geertz in his insistence on keeping the analysis as close as possible to the text and in his insights into the impact of ideational factors in the social sphere; Lévi-Strauss in his imaginative yet detailed application of semiotics to myth analysis.

Some of the criticisms above claimed that Lévi-Strauss limits himself by wishing to explain his discoveries in semiological terms only. Ricoeur claims that it is possible to use Lévi-Strauss's methods to explain myth and then to go beyond these methods to an interpretation which leads to innovation and new understandings. Speculative language and new understandings are very relevant to theology. So it will be my task in the next chapter to explore whether structuralism can be incorporated into Ricoeur's method in a way useful for constructing a local theology.
CHAPTER II
TOWARDS A HERMENEUTIC

The philosopher Paul Ricoeur offers a critique and extension of structuralism. "A new epoch in hermeneutics is opened up by the successes of structural analysis" writes Ricoeur, but adds that one should not stop there. Structuralism as a method is a necessary stage between a "naive" and a "critical" interpretation, but it does not exhaust the meaning of symbolic material. To go beyond the "closed world" of structuralism is to free material for interpretation and new meaning in semantic transcendence.

Limitations of Structuralism

Ricoeur's main difficulty with the semiotic method of structuralism is the "closure" of the system of signs with which it deals. As I outlined in the previous chapter, semiotics is based on an analogy with the phonological systems of linguistics, where no entity has a meaning of its own. Its meaning comes from relations with other units in the same system, and the only relations which matter are those within that system. In myth analysis, structuralism applies the principles of langue to sequences of signs longer than the sentence (phonemes, morphemes . . . mythemes). Thus a myth is treated as something "worldless," no longer with an outside, only an inside.

There are several consequences of such closure. Firstly, when language is the subject of the semiotic method, the closure of the system denies the mediatory function of language "between man and man, between man and the world . . . assuring correspondence between language and world." Ricoeur views language as an unconscious instrument by means of which a speaking subject can attempt to understand being, beings and himself. He finds that when used exclusively, the semiotic method makes the unconscious instrument more important than the act of understanding: the "code" more important than the "message." It is this concern which
has prompted Ricoeur's study of discourse which I will refer to further on in this chapter.

The second consequence of the "closure" of the semiotic method follows from the first. It leaves little room for semantics. Ricoeur argues that for a proper understanding of human discourse one must consider not only the semiotic "sense," but also the semantic "reference." The linguistic sign of Saussure can exist with no other reference than internal relations. But for Ricoeur, "language consists of saying something about something: it thereby escapes towards what it says: it goes beyond itself." Sign as meaning points beyond the system. The difficulty becomes acute with symbolic language which by the very nature of its surplus of meaning transcends the linguistic sign. The symbol "says more than it says." In the collapse of literal reference, "a new vision of reality springs forth, which ordinary vision resists because it is attached to the ordinary use of words." So to know the structure (or meaning-function in Lévi-Straussian terms) of a symbolic vehicle such as a myth, is not to know what it means in a philosophical or existential sense. The structuralist may have "explained" a myth, but has not interpreted it.

Ricoeur's interest is in interpretation or hermeneutics, which is "the theory that regulates the transition from the structure of the work to the world of the work." He is critical of the semiotic method, not because it is erroneous, but because of its limitations which some structuralists fail to acknowledge. The problem comes when one loses a sense of the limits of semiotics in the extension of the structural model beyond its birthplace in linguistics properly speaking to linguistic entities larger than the sentence and to non-linguistic entities similar to the texts of linguistic communication. He maintains that a full study of mythic material should include both "explanation" (structural analysis) of its internal relations, and "interpretation" (actualization of its philosophical or existential meaning for the reader) considering it as a vehicle of communication. Structural analysis is "one stage . . . between a naive interpretation and a critical one, between a surface interpretation and a depth interpretation . . . explanation and understanding at two different stages of a unique hermeneutical arc."
Ricoeur acknowledges that Lévi-Strauss goes beyond the structural model in his analysis.

If this were not the case, structural analysis would be reduced to a sterile game, a divisive algebra, and even the myth itself would be bereaved of the function Lévi-Strauss assigns it. To eliminate this reference to the aporias of existence around which mythic thought gravitates would be to reduce the theory of myth to the necrology of the meaningless discourses of mankind.

But while Lévi-Strauss in fact must go beyond semiotics, he represses the referential function and restricts himself by limiting his explanation to semiological terms.

In the search for an approach which acknowledges the advances of semiotics yet overcomes its limitations, Ricoeur inverts the historical direction of linguistic sciences and begins, not with the smallest entities, but with the whole or what he calls the fullness of language. Thus he investigates the subject of myth as symbol, and discourse, especially discourse reduced to writing. I will describe his thinking in these areas in the section which follows. Ricoeur himself has specified his task.

Language is a problem for phenomenology as well as for linguistic analysis. It has an important role to play in theological exegesis, psychoanalysis, and other fields. In particular I would like to examine the passage from thought, nourished by symbols, especially mythical symbols, to speculation. I am very much interested in the transition from symbols to reflection and that is why I am working on language.

**Ricoeur's Hermeneutics**

**Mythic-Symbolic Language**

Beginning with his attitude to mythic-symbolic language I will ask first, what attitude should one have to such material? Second, what is involved interpreting such language?

Mythic-symbolic language is considered necessary and valid because it is able to attain a level of meaning otherwise unattainable. It is a distinctive dimension of human thought and is essential for a global understanding of humanity.

Ricoeur reacts against those with a "hermeneutics of suspicion" who do not view myth as an a priori valid form. Some thinkers put myth and modernity in juxtaposition. Lévi-Bruhl for instance attempted to
draw a base distinction between the so-called primitive mind and the contemporary European mind with the difference in "prelogical" and "logical" mentality. R. Bultmann makes the distinction between a pre-scientific and scientific worldview which determines human understanding. Such views fall down in a historical-evolutionary hypothesis which questions the validity of mythic-symbolic language and which tends to associate such language with a particular period in human history. Rather than juxtapose a mythic age and a scientific one Ricoeur prefers to juxtapose various levels of consciousness. Both myth and science are legitimate dimensions of human conscious experience and both are necessary for understanding the human person. With such a view, one can interpret mythic material, not at the expense of the mythic-symbolic form, but in a way that the form itself is affirmed. The mythic form can contribute to consciousness because it constitutes a dimension of human experience. Such a human experience for instance is the experience of "limits" or of the "sacred" as power, strength or efficacy. The experience does not allow itself to be completely inscribed within the categories of logos but must be recreated by means of mythos. These regions of experience are reflected in language, so mythic-symbolic language is a valid and meaningful language in the context of other regions or languages because it is a form representing a unique dimension of human experience.

But is knowledge gained through myth "objective?" Though it may be meaningful in one sense, is it meaningless in another sense in that it is not saying anything exterior to itself? Ricoeur does not view reality as a positivist. As a phenomenologist he does not agree that certitude can be gained from an analysis of the objective world. He denies the assumption of Locke and Hume that knowledge occurs through the influence of objects upon the mind. His epistemological attitude, following Husserl, is one of the primacy of consciousness, that the self provides the constitutive basis for knowledge. Consciousness manifests itself in a number of simultaneous dimensions, and one must try to grasp each dimension at its own level.

Take for instance the level of art and poetry. In art, painting is not a shadowy replication of reality. Reconstructing reality on the basis of a limited optic alphabet "yields more by handling less" in an
aesthetic augmentation of reality. The suspension of the referential function of ordinary language in poetry does not mean the abolition of all reference. On the contrary such a suspension allows for the "liberation of another referential dimension of language and another dimension of reality itself." Mythic-symbolic language works similarly. When people desire to go beyond the contingencies of ordinary experience in the quest for totality, in the desire for freedom, in the attempt to overcome limitation, they will employ this kind of language to do it.

Ricoeur uses this approach to symbolic language in his book *The Symbolism of Evil*, where he says, "One must risk an encounter with the symbol, and myths of evil if he is ever to understand fully the actual human experience of evil and the real limitation placed upon freedom." There are three types of language here. Symbols are the most elemental expressions about evil. Myths of evil are interpretations of these symbols. Then there is a language of philosophical interpretation which is fundamentally speculative. Ricoeur draws attention to the temptation of the philosopher to go immediately to the abstract, to the theological doctrine of original sin. However, "we must proceed regressively and revert from the 'speculative' expressions to the 'spontaneous' ones." It is necessary to get behind the rational expression to encounter the consciousness of evil in the symbol.

His approach above is an illustration of responses to both questions at the beginning of this section: the attitude toward mythic-symbolic material and what is involved in interpreting such language. The attitude is one in which such language is affirmed and interpreted as valid. In doing this it is necessary to experience the symbol, to reflect upon the expression of the experience and then to re-experience the symbol, not with the immediacy of the "first naiveté," uncritical, unknowing, but in a second naiveté, with an immediacy enriched by reflection, critique, and by faith. On this level one may experience the mythic-symbolic realm and find meaning in a way nothing else does. This process of the "appropriation" of the symbol will be explained in greater detail in sections which follow.
Ricoeur's theory of the "text" has developed out of his investigation of how to interpret symbolic language. Defining a text as "every utterance or set of utterances fixed by writing"\textsuperscript{22} he investigates language as discourse, what happens when discourse is reduced to writing and what happens when there is a merger between the world of a reader and the world of the text.

Language as discourse comes from the Saussurian distinction between the language system (\textit{langue}) and the language-event (\textit{parole}). Discourse is the language event or linguistic usage. Ricoeur, following the French linguist Benvéniste, observes that language as system and language as discourse follow different rules. The phonological sign is the basic unit of the language system, whereas the sentence is the basic unit of discourse. The sentence is a temporal event. It carries an intended individual message. It has a world in a sense that there is a speaker and one to whom the message is addressed. The phonological sign is none of these, being atemporal, unconscious, anonymous and worldless. The emphasis in most linguistic studies has been upon the language system: "bracketing the message for the sake of the code, the event for the sake of the system, the intention for the sake of the structure, and the arbitrariness of the act for the systematicity of combinations within synchronic systems."\textsuperscript{23} Discourse focuses on the actual message, event, intention. Where the language system has to do with semiotics, discourse has to do with semantics, and for Ricoeur, "the distinction between semantics and semiotics is the key to the whole problem of language."\textsuperscript{24}

Discourse is made up of a dialectic of event and meaning. It comes to actuality in event and continues in meaning, which may be reidentified as the same so that we may say it again or in other words. We may even translate while preserving the "propositional content": the "said as such." "If all discourse is actualized as event, all discourse is understood as meaning."\textsuperscript{25}

There are two sides to the "meaning" of an utterance. There is the subjective meaning of the utterer, but also the objective meaning in the sense of the propositional content. This latter, the propositional content, may be seen as a dialectic of sense ("what") and reference
The sense is immanent to the discourse and correlates
with the identification (nominal) and predicative (verbal) functions
within the sentence. The sense of words can go around without end with-
in a dictionary whereas the reference expresses the movement in which
language transcends itself, relating language to the world. We pre-
suppose reference in discourse, hence we must add a specific prescription
if we want to refer to fictional characters such as those in a novel or
play. In this sense, that language is always fundamentally referential,
Ricoeur says that semiotics presupposes semantics.26

The distinctions in language and discourse described above may
be shown as follows:

Language system
Language-event - event
(Discourse) meaning - subjective
               objective - - - sense
               (propositional
               content)

Fig. 2. Distinctions in Language and Discourse

The dialectic of event and meaning subjective and objective,
and sense and reference, shown in the figure above, achieve greater promi-
nence in the exteriorization of discourse in writing where distance is
established between the utterer and the utterance. In written form
one "fixes" the meaning of the "said" of discourse independently of the
event. Thus the narrowness of the dialogical situation "explodes" and
becomes open for recontextualization by an audience consisting of anyone
who can read. Ricoeur calls this the "spirituality of writing."27 Also,
in the immediacy of the dialogical situation the subjective meaning of
the speaking subject and the propositional content of the discourse
overlap each other in such a way that it is the same thing to understand
what the speaker means and what his or her discourse means. In written
discourse the author's intention and the meaning of the text as propo-
sitional content cease to coincide. "What the text says now matters more
than what the author meant to say."28 The sense-reference dialectic also
achieves greater prominence in writing. In spoken discourse the dialogue
refers to a common situation which may be referred to by pointing or by
"ostensive" reference. Writing distances itself from a situation and
opens up a world of non-ostensive non-situational reference which offers "possible modes of being, as symbolic dimensions of our being-in-the-world." 29

The main point here is the objectification by which the text has escaped its author and the author's situation. 30 "Every exegesis unfolds its procedures within the circumference of a meaning that has broken its moorings to the psychology of its author." 31 This goes contrary to Romanticist hermeneutics which seeks to understand an author better than he understood himself, or Historicist hermeneutics which presupposes that the content of literary works receives its intelligibility from its connection with the conditions of the community that produced it or to which it was destined. 32 The meaning of the text is "suspended" in the written work. It is an open work awaiting the "appropriation" of meaning in the interpretive act of reading.

How then does one accomplish an interpretive reading of a text? Ricoeur goes back to a distinction made by Dilthey between explanation (erklären) and understanding (verstehen). Dilthey saw a logical gap between these two ways of approach, the first being modelled after the inductive logic of the natural sciences, the second on the sphere of signs in the human sciences. His theory of the objectification of discourse in the text allows Ricoeur to approach the sphere of signs in a "scientific" manner similar to that for the natural sciences. The written text, in its fixation of meaning, dissociation from the mental intention of the author, display of non-ostensive reference and universal range of its addressees, can no longer be modelled on the dialogical situation of speaking/hearing. The objectivity of the writing/reading situation leads to new explanatory procedures and the possibility of a dialectical relation between explanation and understanding in the appropriation of meaning. For the sake of clarity Ricoeur describes the process in two phases: a move from understanding to explanation and a move from explanation to comprehension; explanation being a mediation between two stages of understanding.

The first move from understanding to explanation takes the form of a "guess" or "wager." There are several reasons why it should take this form. There is the disjunction of meaning and intention in the text. Furthermore the text is not a mere sequence of sentences all on an equal
footing so that a presupposition of a certain kind of whole is implied in a recognition and judgement of the relative importance of the parts. There is a process of narrowing down the literary genre and class of texts to which the text belongs. There is a perspectivist aspect. The text "may be viewed from several sides, but never from all sides at once." There is a plurivocility not only in the text as a whole, but in the multiple meanings deriving from metaphoric and symbolic usage. So the text is open to different readings. The reader generating a new event from the text in which the initial event has been objectified is likened to an orchestra conductor making music by obeying the instructions of the notation on a musical score.

There are no methods for making such guesses, or rules for generating insights, but there are ways to test and criticize one's guesses through the objectively grounded choice between two probability judgments on the basis of common evidence which supports them. If two judgments conflict, then it may be possible to prove one false, even though one may not be certain that the other is true. Alternatively there may be a comparative weighing of evidence. Does it occur in a particular class more often than not? Is it possible to narrow the class; evidence of the narrower class being more weighty? For example, the average age at death for males in the U. S. may be a certain figure, but one's guess of a particular person's life expectancy might be more correct if one could determine whether a man smoked or not and predict on figures for that narrower class. Another principle of probability judgments is that one accepts a hypothesis which makes functional, more elements of a mute text than a rival hypothesis. These are general principles for testing one's guesses in particular cases so that one may come to an objective interpretation of the meaning of a text. Guess and validation are in a sense circularly related as subjective and objective approaches to the text. One enters the "hermeneutical circle" of believing and understanding. But the circle escapes being a vicious one of self-confirmability because of the criteria of falsifiability in the conflict of competing interpretations.

The first move from understanding in the guess and its validation may be followed by a second move from explanation to comprehension. This explanation-comprehension dialectic is related to the sense-reference
dialectic considered previously. The referential intention is "suspended" in the written text and as readers, "He may either remain in a kind of state of suspense as regards any kind of referred to reality, or we may imaginatively actualize the potential non-ostensive references of the text in a new situation, that of the reader."\(^{36}\) This is where we find the difference between semiotics and semantics. Semiotics, as described above in the section on Ricoeur's critique of structuralism, suspends the reference, acting on the text as a worldless entity with only an interior. Semantics opens the text to non-ostensive reference, "the direction which it opens up for our thought."\(^{37}\) These two, the semiotics and semantics, work together in the dialectic of explanation and comprehension. One is an act on the text, the other an act of the text. "By means of its structure the text had only a semiological dimension; by means of the actualization it now has a semantic dimension."\(^{38}\) The function of structural analysis is to move from a surface semantics of the narrated discourse to the depth semantics which constitutes the ultimate referent of the text. In this way structural analysis performs a mediatory function, revealing a depth semantics between the text and the appropriation of the meaning of the text. Through a depth semantics, one appropriates not the surface psychological and subjective characteristics of the text, but the deeper character of what the "text" says. The depth semantics discloses a possible world and a possible way of orienting oneself within it. Through the depth semantics the reader appropriates the meaning of the text in a new way of looking at things and a new self understanding. This process, just described, may be shown as follows:

\[\text{Text} \quad \text{(Romanticist)}\]
\[\text{Surface Semantics} \quad \rightarrow \text{hermeneutics} \quad \rightarrow \text{Appropriation}\]
\[\text{Structural Analysis} \quad \rightarrow \text{Disclosure} \quad \rightarrow \text{Depth Semantics}\]

\[\text{Disclosure} \quad \rightarrow \text{(possible world)}\]

\[\text{Appropriation} \quad \rightarrow \text{(new way of looking at things)}\]

Fig. 3. Appropriation through Depth Semantics

I have included Romanticist hermeneutics in parentheses in the figure above to show how it appropriates meaning directly from the surface semantics,
not differentiating between the subjective meaning, and the objective meaning (propositional content) disclosed in the depth semantics.

In summary, I have described Ricoeur's theory of the text arising out of discourse, that dialectics of event and meaning, sense and reference, which becomes accentuated in the exteriorization of writing. It is the task of the reader to make this distancing productive in the appropriation of the meaning of the text. Through this appropriation the reader actualizes the semantic virtualities of the text, overcomes cultural and temporal distance and comes to a greater self understanding. Thus the "destiny" of the text is accomplished and one reaches the other end of the "hermeneutical arch," "the anchor of the arch in the soil of lived experience." It remains to investigate Ricoeur's view of symbol and metaphor, for it is through these mechanisms that one is opened to the realm of religious and speculative thinking.

Symbol and Metaphor

Symbol is a central topic in Ricoeur's work, certainly since The Symbolism of Evil. But his ideas have developed to some extent in this area. In The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur gives a textual analysis of symbolic discourse in myth. Later he declares his aim to be a "hermeneutics of rational symbols whose task is to reconstruct the layers of meaning which have become sedimented in the concept [of original sin]." In Interpretation Theory he admits a change,

I used to link the task of hermeneutics primarily to the deciphering of the several layers of meaning in metaphoric and symbolic language. I think today however, that metaphoric and symbolic language is not paradigmatic for a general theory of hermeneutics. This theory must cover the whole problem of discourse, including writing and literary composition. But, even here, the theory of metaphor and of symbolic expressions may be said to provide a decisive extension to the field of meaningful expressions, by adding the problematic of multiple meaning to that of meaning in general.

This is the reason for ordering this chapter as I have, so as to situate symbol and metaphor within the context of the problem of discourse. Metaphor and symbolic language is not paradigmatic for a general theory of language as is discourse or the language event at the sentence level. In this section on symbol and metaphor I will deal first with Ricoeur's
definition of symbol, then how it gives rise to thought in reflection on the experience, which leads to a new appreciation of the symbol in a second naiveté. I will then describe how he has come to focus on the metaphorical function within symbol and how that can offer the possibility for speculative thought.

In his early works Ricoeur defines symbol as a linguistic expression which lends itself to double or multiple meanings. "Symbols occur when language produces signs of composite degree in which the meaning, not satisfied with designating some one thing, designates another meaning attainable only in and through the first intentionality." He makes comparisons in order to delineate what he means. His definition is narrower than that of Ernst Cassirer, whose idea of symbol as filling a sensory content with meaning; a mediation between ourselves and the "real," would be better called a "sign," for it wipes out the important distinction between univocal and plurivocal expressions. Ricoeur's definition is wider than analogy in the strict sense of reasoning by proportionality. Analogy is but one of the relations involved. As he shows in *Freud and Philosophy*, the symbolism of dreams is much more complex than that of classic analogy. Such symbolism demands interpretation which is a work of understanding that aims at deciphering the complex meaning of symbols.

Ricoeur says that he is "enchanted" by a phrase from Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, "The symbol gives rise to thought." The hermeneutical problem comes from within the very life of symbols taken at their semantic and mythical level. Symbols call for interpretation out of their excess of meaning and they call for reflection, especially where they occur in myths. "In their mythical forms symbols themselves push toward speculative expression; symbols themselves are the dawn of reflection."

In some of his earlier work Ricoeur outlines procedures for thinking about symbols. The procedure (which lies as a basis for the interpretation of texts) moves from a naive appreciation through critical reflection to a critical appreciation or second naiveté. The first task is an enumeration of symbolic forms which will be as full and complete as possible. One must look in the areas of three modalities of symbolism: the cosmic, the oneiric and the poetic. Cosmic symbolism is that of the phenomenology of religion: the theophanies and hierophanies of symbols.
which constitute the language of the "sacred." Oneiric symbolism is that of psychoanalysis: the dreams of our days and nights. Dreams like myths can be told, analyzed and interpreted. Poetic symbolism operates through the reduction of referential values of ordinary discourse so that new configurations produced by the poetic imagination in sensory, visual, acoustic or other imagery, can be brought to language. This first procedure is what Ricoeur in The Conflict of Interpretations calls the semantic level: the level of comparative phenomenology that limits itself to understanding symbols through symbols. But, says Ricoeur, this is "truth at a distance, reduced, from which one has expelled the question: do I believe that . . . . One is running from one symbol to another without oneself being anywhere."

The second task—that of reflection—passes from a statics to a dynamics of symbols. Symbols are not only given, they are decided upon. One must abandon the position of a remote and disinterested spectator and enter the hermeneutical circle: believing for the sake of understanding which is also understanding for the sake of believing. The process of philosophical reflection involves a demythologization which is recognizing myth as such with the purpose of freeing its symbolic basis. He is opposed to demythicizing which involves the false reduction of the symbolic form. In demythologization "thought advances between two chasms of allegory and gnosticism." To allegorize is to employ a hermeneutic whereby one allows a translation between the literal and symbolic meaning so that the symbolic relation becomes useless. Gnosis rationalizes symbols, destroying them in affixing an etiological or explanatory function. A true demythologization looks not to secondary symbols (myth) or tertiary symbols (philosophical speculation), but to primary symbols, recognizing their power to reveal. Such an interpretation aims to hear again, not in the immediacy of precritical belief, but in a second naiveté which "aims to be the postcritical equivalent of the precritical hierophany."

The experience of symbol in a second naiveté is only one dimension of a hermeneutics of symbol. There is another dimension where the human subject comes into the hermeneutical analysis. The individual subject must go beyond the initial "false consciousness," from misunderstanding to understanding. This is where Ricoeur is critical of Freud and Hegel.
"It is one thing to use hermeneutics as a weapon of suspicion against 'mystification' of false consciousness, it is another thing to use it as a preparation for better understanding of what once made sense." Con-
sciousness is not immediate self-consciousness (intuition) but is mediated by the mirror of the world. Reflection upon equivocal signs is one of the ways we come to self-consciousness.

Ricoeur compares two opposed views of human consciousness: Freud's archeology of the subject in the regression toward the childhood of the self, and Hegel's teleology of the spirit in the progression of becoming aware.51 Both of these involve hermeneutics of "suspicion" in a mistrust of the immediacy of consciousness unredeemed by a hermeneutics of belief. Ricoeur uses a dialectic between the archê and the telos of the subject. Symbols form the concrete moment of this dialectic.52 "Sym-

bols carry two vectors. On the one hand, symbols repeat our childhood in the senses . . . of that childhood. On the other hand, they explore our adult life. . . . Disguise reveal; conceal, show; these two functions are no longer external to one another; they express the two sides of a single symbolic function."53 In this way, says Ricoeur, the second naiveté would be a second Copernican revolution. The being which posits itself in the Cogito has to discover that the very act by which it abstracts itself from the whole does not cease to share in the being that challenges it in every symbol.

His more recent writings have shown a change in Ricoeur's think-
ing on symbol. He has found that it is not the purely semantic structure as he had previously supposed.

In my earlier writing, especially The Symbolism of Evil and Freud and Philosophy, I directly defined hermeneutics by an object which seemed to be both as broad and as precise as possible, I mean the symbol . . . Today I am less certain that one can attack the prob-
lem so directly without first having taken linguistics into account. Within the symbol, it now seems to me, there is something non-
semantic as well as something semantic . . . 54

So in order to clarify the semantic and non-semantic dimension of symbol he looks to the less complex problem of double meaning in terms of metaphors.

Ricoeur defines metaphor as "an extension of denotation by a transference of labels to new objects which resist the transfer."55 In
contrast to the classical "substitution" theory of metaphor, Ricoeur's theory is a semantic one having to do with language in discourse. "Metaphor proceeds from the tension between all the terms in a metaphorical statement." The tension arises at the level of interpretation, where the metaphorical interpretation preserves meaning through the contradiction which thwarts understanding on a literal level. In opposition to those who hold metaphor as a trope, he argues that metaphor has to do with predication in a sentence. One must talk, not of the metaphorical use of a word, but of the tension between two terms in a metaphorical utterance. Metaphor is not a deviation from a literal meaning of words. It results from two opposed interpretations of an utterance in a "metaphorical twist." Furthermore, metaphor has not to do with resemblance as is commonly thought, but rather the opposite: the appearance of kinship where ordinary vision does not perceive any relationship. So a metaphor is alive in a creative tension. "There are no live metaphors in a dictionary." Real metaphors are not translatable because they create their meaning, telling us something new about reality.

It is in the operation of metaphor that one can gain insight into the implicit semantics of symbol. "What remains confused in symbol -- the assimilation of one thing to another, and of us to things; the endless correspondence between the elements--is clarified in the tension of the metaphorical utterance." Symbol has a non-linguistic dimension rooted in different areas of our experience. The symbols in dreams, discovered in conjunction with psychoanalysis, hesitate on the dividing line between bios and logos. The symbol in poetic language is bound to the rules of composition. The symbol found in the phenomenology of religion is rooted in the power of myth and ritual, neither of which can be reduced linguistically. The capacity of sacred symbols to speak is founded in the capacity of the cosmos to signify. Hence the "correspondence between the tillable soil and the feminine organ, between the fecundity of the earth and the maternal womb, between the sun and our eyes, semen and seeds, burial and the sowing of grain, birth and the return of spring." This is the non-linguistic aspect of symbol in its work of mediation and logic of correspondences which has roots in the shadowy experience of the power of our fantasies, of the imaginary modes of being which ignite the poetic expression, and of the sacred. Metaphor brings this non-linguistic
dimension of symbol into relief, for metaphor is a linguistic pro-
cedure, a "bizarre form of predication." The two, symbol and metaphor
are closely related. Metaphors bring to language the implicit seman-
tics of symbol. In a sense symbols are "dead metaphors" which have
found root in life through the ability to give rise to thought. "Meta-
phors are the linguistic surface of symbols, and they owe their power
to relate the semantic surface to the presemantic surface in the depths
of human experience to the two-dimensional structure of the symbol."59

Metaphor is significant not only from a linguistic perspective
but also in relation to philosophy and speculative discourse. Ricoeur
says that the "possibility of speculative discourse lies in the semantic
dynamics of the metaphorical expression."60 One may speak in metaphor,
and speak about metaphor. Speculative discourse is possible because one
may think and speak about metaphor.

Speculative discourse, metaphor and interpretation go together.
Metaphor reaches out for speculative reflection, and interpretation is
"a mode of discourse that functions at the intersection of two domains,
metaphorical and speculative . . . . On one side, interpretation seeks
the clarity of the concept; on the other, it hopes to preserve the
dynamism of meaning that the concept holds and pins down."62 Metaphor
lives when it introduces a spark of imagination into a "thinking more"
at the conceptual level. "This struggle to 'think more,' guided by the
'vivifying principle,' is the 'soul' of interpretation."63 It is in the
creative tension of the "thinking more" that the metaphoric function of-
ers a possibility of a path from an inadequate interpretation to a new
and more adequate one in a redescription of reality.

New meanings from the semantic "impertinence" of the metaphor
bring to light new aspects of reality by means of semantic innovation.
The tension of the metaphor resides in the meaning of "to be"; in its
description of reality in a non-literal way. The "is" is both a literal
"is not" and a metaphorical "is like." So there is a movement from sense
to reference to metaphorical truth: not what things are, but what they
are like.64

In this philosophical sense, metaphor works in the ontological
order: in the arena of being and non-being. Metonymy works in a logical
order of the relations of connection. Together they contribute to the
power of symbols. "Root metaphors" are the "dominant metaphors capable
of both engendering and organizing a network that serves as a junction
between the symbolic level with its slow evolution and the more volatile
metaphorical level." Sometimes this may be in isolated sentences or
in a given work, or wider still in a particular linguistic community,
culture or sphere of culture. Some metaphors "seem to haunt all human
discourse. These metaphors, which Wheelwright calls archetypes, be-
come indistinguishable from the symbolic paradigms Eliade studies in his
Patterns of Comparative Religion." On the one hand myth is a hermen-
eutics of the symbol, on the other, the symbol constitutes a reservoir
of meaning whose metaphoric potential is yet to be spoken.

Ricoeur and Depth Psychology: A Comment

I think it is unfortunate that Ricoeur has given so much attention
to Freud and almost none to Jung. In Freud and Philosophy he writes,
"I must admit that this firmness of rigor makes me prefer Freud to Jung.
With Freud I know where I am going; with Jung everything risks being
confused: the psychism, the soul, the archetypes, the sacred." Else-
where he makes no distinction between Freud and Jung when a significant
distinction could be made. He terms Freud's method a "hermeneutics of
suspicion" because his method of free association leading to knowledge
of repressed memories does not appreciate dream symbolism in itself.
This was the issue over which Jung broke with Freud. Jung wrote,
"... dreams have some special and more significant function of their
own ... I gradually gave up following associations that led far away
from the text of the dream. I chose to concentrate rather on the associ-
ations of the dream itself." This is closer to what Ricoeur calls a
hermeneutics of restoration than a hermeneutics of suspicion. By ap-
preciating symbolism for itself, with its own unique function, Jung is
less reductionist than Freud.

Also Jung's method is more in line with Ricoeur's theory of the
text. He looks for what the unconscious is "saying" in a way analogous
to looking for what a text is saying. Similarly with Ricoeur's theory
of the "closure" of the text; Jung holds that only material that is
clearly part of a dream should be used for interpreting it. For
these reasons and others which will become apparent in my use of Jung
in Chapter III, I think that Jung's thought may be used fruitfully in developing a hermeneutic of a mythic text.

Summary and Conclusion

Ricoeur shows that structuralism as a method of interpretation is limited by the closure of the system of signs with which it deals. Such closure denies the mediatory function of language. Also such a method does not exhaust the meaning of language, especially its symbolic dimension.

So, starting with the fullness of language as discourse, he devises a hermeneutic which takes account of the semantic dimension as well as the semiotic. One can distinguish the meaning from the event of discourse, and this distinction is accentuated in writing, where the meaning is objectified so that the "text" can be said to have a meaning of its own which is not a subset of the author's system of reference. The text is open for the appropriation of meaning in an interpretive act of reading.

There are two "movements" in such a reading. Firstly, there is a guess at the meaning of the text, taking into account the plurivocity within the text, for instance in symbolic usage, and the relative importance given to different parts of the text. One must choose between competing interpretations. Secondly, the objectification of the written text allows it to be open for structural analysis which can take one below the surface semantics of the narrative to the depth semantics which discloses a non-ostensive world of possible meanings. The reader's task is to actualize the semantic virtualities in the text.

The symbolic dimension is both a part and an independent dimension in "reading" a mythic text. In earlier writings such as The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur had a neat schema whereby, as interpretations of primary symbols, myths are "secondary" symbols. His more recent writing, while not denying the above, is less systematic. Both "primary" symbols and mythic texts give rise to speculative thinking. The "is"-"is not" tension of metaphorical usage resulting in a "thinking more" and the consequent semantic innovation, helps one understand the linguistic dimensions of primary symbols. Symbols, including their non-linguistic (cosmic, oneiric) dimensions are an important consideration in the
plurivocity within the text. The interpretation of the written myth must also work with the plurivocity of the text as a whole. Symbols open a way to the primordial human experiences "behind the text" which ground the myth. Through an appreciation of these symbols in a second naïveté, and of the mythic text as a secondary symbol, one may come to a post-critical understanding which reaches "in front of the text" in a creative response. Ricoeur puts it as follows:

We can now give a name to this non-ostensive reference. It is the kind of world opened up by the depth semantics of the text, a discovery, which has immense consequences regarding what is usually called the sense of the text.

The sense of a text is not behind the text, but in front of it. It is not something hidden, but something disclosed. What has to be understood is not the initial situation of discourse, but what points towards a possible world, thanks to the non-ostensive reference of the text. Understanding has less than ever to do with the author and his situation. It seeks to grasp the world-propositions opened up by the reference of the text. To understand a text is to follow its movement from sense to reference: from what it says, to what it talks about.71

I have learned from Ricoeur that one may never exhaust the possible meanings of a mythic text. His insights, especially in his treatment of symbols and his showing that one may move from a surface semantics through structural analysis to a depth semantics and thinking from the text, will help disclose sufficient insights for a theological interpretation of a New Guinea initiation myth. In the final section of this chapter I will outline the procedure which I will follow to find what the myth "talks about."

A Schema for Interpretation

My aim in interpreting a myth is to discover its meaning: what it talks about. Mythic-symbolic language deals with meanings which are not able to be expressed in any other way. Thus my interpretation will concern symbols which represent unique dimensions of human experience. On the premise that I share the same "underlying" human experience that the myth talks about, it is possible for me, using the procedures which I will outline, to come to some appreciation of the symbols and thus to come to some understanding of the "message" which the symbols encode. The symbols, both primary and secondary can be appreciated in similar,
yet separate processes. Both involve entering a hermeneutical circle: believing in order to understand, understanding so as to believe.

The first procedure (A) may be shown as follows:

Believing

Primary Symbol

cries out for interpretation

Subject: new critical appreciation in second naivété

understanding

Fig. 4. Interpretation of Primary Symbols

The symbol, in the "metaphorical twist" of its linguistic dimension or the archetypal rootedness of its non-linguistic dimension cries out for interpretation. Turner's analysis of the meaning of symbols will be helpful here at this basic semantic level. I will also consider the various dimensions used by Ricoeur; the poetic, oneiric, and cosmic dimensions. The poetic is like the metaphoric surface of the symbol. The oneiric dimensions look for the insights from psychoanalysis. The cosmic dimension seeks insights from the phenomenology of religion; of the capacity of the cosmos to signify. But going beyond the semantic level I must enter the circle of believing-reflection, neither translating nor rationalizing away the symbol, but trying to appreciate it in its power both to reveal and to conceal. This is somewhat like the method explained by Geertz, but unlike Geertz I will follow a second procedure which seeks meaning through a dimension considerably removed from the surface of the text.

The second procedure (B) also includes a hermeneutical circle of believing (guessing) and understanding (hermeneutical arch). The hermeneutical arch involves the explanation-understanding dialectic shown on p. 30. The guess will mean acknowledging my presuppositions of the genre and the significance of the various parts of the textual whole. This will be influenced to some extent by the plurivocity of the symbols encountered by procedure A. Moreover findings from procedure B will
help validate those in A. The structural analysis involves the method of myth-analysis of Claude Lévi-Strauss, described on pp. of Chapter I. The analysis will produce a new understanding of the structure or meaning-function of the myth. The oppositions and mediations, inversions and paradoxes in the deep-level arrangement of contents will provide insights into the underlying message of what the myth is saying.

Fig. 5. Interpretation of Secondary Symbols

The interaction of these two procedures (A) and (B) will provide me with new possibilities for "thinking more" from the myth and understanding what the myth talks about in the sense of its importance for myself and the theological world of which I am a part. It is the way the myth impinges on the theological world which will be the subject of the final chapter.
CHAPTER III

INTERPRETATION OF AN INITIATION MYTH

The Myth of Kaunala Tape

1. At the time when the ground and water began there lived two men: Auwala, also known as Kimape, and his younger brother Kaunala Tape. The elder brother was big and strong and was able to cut a garden from the forest. The younger brother Kaunala Tape used to cut firewood and fetch water. His legs and hands were small and his hair was soft and fair.

2. Kimape cut down strong trees like pipi and maukele to build a fence around his garden. When finished, the fence looked like possum's teeth. He grew taro and these grew like rat's tails. So much green food appeared that it looked like a lake.

3. However Kimape was not happy. He used to think about where he could find a woman to share the fruits of his labor. As he sat thinking a piawi bird alighted on a nearby tree. Kimape spoke to the bird and asked, "Is there a ceremonial dance somewhere?" "Are they dancing somewhere?" The bird did not reply so Kimape sat silently for a while, then he asked, "Are they beating drums and is there a celebration somewhere?" As he spoke the bird took a twig in its beak and flew away along the Yongope river.

4. Then the older brother called out and told Kaunala Tape that they should kill the pig which they owned. Kaunala Tape objected saying that the pig was his. But the elder brother explained how he was going to a ceremonial dance down at the Hewa and that they must kill the pig, so Kaunala Tape went to the garden to get food, and prepared to kill the pig. He cut firewood with his stone axe and prepared the ground oven; then he brought out their pig which had ears like plates and a nose like a kundu drum. He struck it on the head, killed it, and scorched off the hair.

5. Kaunala Tape called out to his brother, "I've got everything ready but I won't eat with you. If you give me taro I won't eat it. I eat only snakes."

6. Kimape butchered the pig and put it in the ground oven. When it was cooked he removed it and ate half of it. He put the head and entrails on top of Kaunala Tape's house. Then he called his brother and told him how he was going to the Hewa or the Sepik. Kaunala Tape saw that his brother was a big man. His legs were strong enough to carry four women, but he did not have any
decorations. His head was bare. So Kaunala Tape teased his brother's hair and put feathers in it.

7. Kimape told his brother that he would be away three days. If on the third day he saw smoke rising from a distant mountain, then he should cook the test of the pig and prepare food.

8. The next day Kaunala Tape took his bow and arrows and went into the forest. He sat down on a fallen tree and thought about his older brother. Then he saw a beautiful bird feeding on some berries. Kaunala Tape wanted to shoot the bird and whispered a spell as he crept up to the tree. Tapeyo (Kaunala Tape) thought it would be good if he could shoot the bird as he had given all his decorative feathers to his brother. If his brother brought some girls back, then he could wear the new feathers and surprise them all. He shot at the bird and hit it. Tapeyo danced for joy. However he had not killed it and the bird was able to fly to another tree. Tapeyo was only small and found it difficult to keep up with the wounded bird as it flew from tree to tree. He was still following when darkness came. There was no house so Tapeyo slept in a hollow at the base of a large tree where cassowaries and wild pigs sometimes slept.

9. He woke to the bird's cry. Again he tried to follow the bird but fell down and he began to wonder why he was hunting so deep in the forest. He would have preferred to stay near his house.

10. Then he heard a girl calling angrily. As she approached Kaunala Tape hid behind a garden fence and watched, his eyes wide open with fear. The girl was very beautiful and wore several pearl shells around her neck. She was obviously wealthy.

11. The girl asked Tapeyo whether he had shot her pig. Tapeyo replied that he had not shot a pig, only a bird. Then the girl took a stick and began to beat him on the head. Tapeyo told her that she was not hurting him. "I know you," he said, "You are the child of Patali Tambu." Then he poked her in the breast. It hurt her and Tapeyo was able to run away. He ran to the girl's house and she followed him.

12. At the house she asked Tapeyo if he would like some food. He said he would like this and that she should go and get food and prepare it for him, meanwhile he would cut firewood. Tapeyo said that it would be good if they had pig too, so the girl killed the pig which Tapeyo had shot. Tapeyo made the girl do the hard work while he went and looked for snakes. She had to kill and cut the pig and prepare the ground oven. When it was cooked, she had to remove it. When it was ready Tapeyo told her that she had to eat it all by herself; he only ate snakes. "I know your name," he said, "It is Iputime."

13. When she heard that he would not eat and that he had been lying to her, Iputime wept for a long time, then took all the food and went to another house. She called out to Tapeyo that he should go
away, but he replied that it was nearly night and that he would like to sleep in her house. However Iputime told him that there would be a full moon and that he should go hunting possums.

14. So Tapeyo borrowed a bow and arrows from Iputime and asked where would be the best place to go if he wanted to find possums. The girl directed him to a large fallen tree. He did not really want to go. He felt cold and would have much preferred to stay close to the fire, but he was afraid of the girl and so went to find the tree which she had told him about. She told him not to look at the ground, but to look only at the mountains above him. He did this and fell into a lake. He went inside the lake and found the tree which the girl had spoken of.

15. He sat down on the tree and suddenly grew into a mature man with thick hair. He went back to Iputime and she told him that he could not come close to her. He had to sit down on the other side of the house. She gave him food which he ate and then asked whether she could comb his hair. She combed his hair so that it came up like a new moon in the sky. She combed his hair and put all sorts of decorations on his head and body. Then she told him that his brother was coming back with a Hewa girl and that he should go and prepare food back at his own house. "I wanted to marry him," she said, "but he has gone to marry a Hewa girl." She told him that the young sister of the Hewa girl was coming along too. She must not see Tapeyo's house.

16. Iputime warned Tapeyo that his brother might not have enough bride price to satisfy the Hewa people. If he did not have enough then Tapeyo should get a pearl shell which Iputime would put in his house. She gave him eight sweet potatoes and told him to eat some on the road, and to put some in his house.

17. Tapeyo came to his home and saw the smoke. He ate the sweet potato which Iputime had given him and changed back into a thin young boy again. He cooked food for his brother and then went to find snakes for himself to eat.

18. Presently his brother arrived with the two Hewa girls. They were laughing and eating sugar cane. The bigger sister ate all the sugar cane and her little sister was angry at this. "Why do you eat everything when you don't even make gardens where you live?" she told her. The older sister did not like this and they fought in the garden.

19. When they had finished fighting, Tapeyo invited them to come and eat the pig which he had cooked. While they ate pork, he ate snakes. The little Hewa girl looked at Tapeyo and decided that she would like to marry him.

20. Tapeyo's brother told him that he wanted to get the bride price ready, so Tapeyo went into the forest to try to find wild pigs, possums and cassowaries. In the morning the Hewa people came, but when they saw the payment they exclaimed, "Are you really
giving bride price or are you merely playing?" Then they took the
girl away with them. Kimape wept. Tapeyo went and ate some of
the sweet potato which Iputime had given him. He ate and grew to
become a mature man again. He ran after the Hewa people and asked
them where they were going. They explained how they had gone to
collect payment for one of their sisters, but that the two brothers
had not given proper payment and they were going home with the girl.
Tapeyo told them that he had a special pearl shell which he would
give them if they went back to see Kimape. Tapeyo went to his
house, collected the shell and some pigs which Iputime had left
there and presented them to the girl's people. When the Hewa had
gone Tapeyo went down to the Yongope river, ate some of the sweet
potato which Iputime had given him and became small and thin again
as before.

21. The younger Hewa girl came to Tapeyo's house and he gave her
a pearl shell and a pig. But the girl put Tapeyo in her net bag
and carried him down to the Hewa region, leading his pig behind
her.

22. When they reached the Hewa she hung Tapeyo up in a net bag
inside the house of an old woman. The old Hewa women said they
would like to eat Tapeyo and argued over who would eat his head.
The women went to find greens to cook with Tapeyo, and while they
were away Tapeyo managed to cut a hole in the net bag and escape.

23. He went back to his house and ate some sweet potato and de-
veloped into a strong man again. Then he went to find Iputime,
but found her gardens overgrown and her house rotting. All that
was left inside the house was a net bag containing some taro and
some tanget leaves used in a net bag for a baby to lie on. Tapeyo
called out for her but there was no reply.

24. So he set out to find her. He climbed to one mountain and
slept there the night. The next day he came to an open place where
there had been a dance, but all the people had gone. That night he
slept in a cave. During the night a demon attacked him and they
fought until morning. In another cave he found a possum which came
and sat next to the fire. Tapeyo fed the possum with pork and then
followed it. The going was difficult and in the very steep spots
Tapeyo held the possum's tail. They came to the top of the highest
mountain and could see as far as Wabag, Porgera, Tari, Kopiago, Wage,
Paiepa, Mount Hagen, Laiagam, and Hewa. Tapeyo could see everywhere.

25. A girl approached Tapeyo and talked to him. He followed her
to her house where plenty of women were gathered. Iputime and her
child were with them. Tapeyo wanted to go into the house but the
women told him to go to the men's house.

26. Iputime his wife woke him in the morning. Together they went
to the garden and cooked taro. Then she told him to go to the Hewa
because they were killing the pig which he had given to the young
Hewa girl. "You can only stay three days in the Hewa," she said to
him. "You must be back here within five days."
27. So Tapeyo went down to the Yongope river and came to the Hewa. He had to stay more than five days as they killed the pig on the sixth day. The next day he started back, but the young Hewa girl followed him. This annoyed Tapeyo. They went through the bush and night came and they slept in the base of a tree, Tapeyo on one side, the girl on the other. In the middle of the night Tapeyo crept away. Tapeyo was mistaken. He thought the girl was the younger sister of the Hewa girl whom his brother had married, but really she was the sister of Iputime his wife.

28. Tapeyo took a long time to find a way home and he was extremely hungry. At one place he found a young man cooking a pig. Tapeyo hid, but the young man saw him. He offered Tapeyo some pork and sweet potato saying that it was from his wife Iputime. Tapeyo ate and grew big again.

29. Then he went and found Iputime in a house nearby. She had almost given him up for lost because he had not come back within five days, and so she was delighted to see him. They ate pig together.

30. That night he went hunting possums accompanied by Iputime's dog. Iputime warned him that he must not lose the dog or they would not be able to go to the sky. They brought the possums home and bound them up with vine. She told him to put some of the possums in his net bag because he could exchange them for a pig the next day.

31. The next day at a kepele ritual offering they bought a pig, a very old sickly one. However later when they killed the pig, it suddenly turned into a large healthy one, bigger than any other pig that they had seen. As they cut the pig Iputime warned Tapeyo that her sister whom he had left alone in the bush was very angry with him and that he should present her with the pig's heart. This he did and she was pleased.

32. Iputime then told Tapeyo that he should leave the pig cooking in the oven until the part of the kepele ceremony when an old man climbs onto the oko house to sing. Tapeyo did as she said. They removed their pig from the ground oven before anyone else and they left the gathering. Together they climbed a nearby mountain. They found another young woman on top of the mountain. They found another young woman on top of the mountain. They climbed to the top of the mountain. Together the four of them: Tapeyo, Iputime, her sister and the young woman, went into the sky and the clouds hid them from sight.
Surface Semantics

Detecting Symbols

Symbols happen when a word, phrase or image conveys a meaning other than a literal (intrinsic prior) one. The plurivocity is not immediately apparent to the reader unfamiliar with the text. However Turner and Lévi-Strauss are helpful in their techniques for uncovering symbols. Following Turner, one may look for meanings associated with components of the moral and social orders (norms, values, etc.) which could be conveyed through sensory outward forms. Or, working the other way around, one may look for meanings associated with outward forms which could be conveyed through inner, unconscious forms. The first approach, according to Turner,\(^2\) is the domain of anthropology, the latter, the domain of depth psychology. I will take both approaches into account.

Another technique from structuralism recognizes the relativity of symbolism in dyadic and triadic relations where elements are defined in opposition, but exist only in relation to a third entity. Aletta Biersack illustrates this in the following manner.\(^3\) A single entity has no symbolic value unless contrasted with another. For instance, one

\[
\begin{align*}
| & A \\
\end{align*}
\]

does not know if the line (A) is long or short. But when contrasted with another (B), one can perceive the relative difference and judge that (A) is long. The presumption in this example is that (A) and (B) are in a comparative frame. It is only in relation to a third term (C) that one can put (A) and (B) in such a frame. In the example below left,

\[
\begin{align*}
| & A & B \\
| & C \\
\end{align*}
\]

(A) and (B) are "close" in contrast to (C). But in the right example there is an internal relation of "closeness" between (B) and (C) in contrast to the external relation with (A). Dyadic and triadic relations will be important in my analysis of symbol in the myth.
I will look first for symbols on the poetic surface. Then I will go to the presemantic level which Ricoeur divides into the cosmic and oneiric. However I do not think that Ricoeur's "cosmic" sphere is sufficiently discriminating to pick up some of the symbolic nuances. I prefer to follow Lévi-Strauss who makes finer distinctions between the cosmic-geographic, social and techno-economic spheres. The division may be illustrated in the following way.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>semantic surface - poetic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pre-semantic surface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 6. Spheres of Symbolism

Poetic Symbolism

My ability to detect poetic symbolism is even more restricted than my admittedly limited understanding of the vernacular, for it means finding not only the literal meaning, but also perceiving the tension between that and a hidden meaning. I can draw attention to the use of two morphemes which signal the hearer that a term is not to be taken in its standard sense. The morpheme yale is what Borchard calls an "irreal condition suffix." With verbs it indicates that a statement is contrary to experience or not witnessed. According to Biersach, "Things that are analogous but not identical to other things take the special morpheme yale, which in this context means 'x is like but not actually y.'" This morpheme occurs four times in the first sentence of the myth, associated with ground, water, men, and the name Auwala. Thus the hearer knows that the meaning of these is not the same as the standard experienced usage. The second morpheme is ekene, used with the characters of the myth to indicate that they are not real people but the first people on earth, different from today. The difference which these two morphemes reveal on the linguistic surface, between real and irreal, known and unknown, will recur in my analysis.
**Cosmic and Geographic Symbolism**

The Ipili universe has three principle parts: the sky and bleached mountain cliff-faces (*ati kenga*), the uncleared forest and the interior of the earth (*yuu pango*), and the ground surface (*yuu or yuu kenga*). The sun, moon and spirit-beings called "sky-people" are the principle inhabitants of *ati kenga*. Other spirits, including the spirits of dead humans inhabit *yuu pango*. Human beings and sometimes the ghosts of the recent dead are in *yuu kenga*, the band of mountainside between 5,500 feet and 7,500 feet which they live on and cultivate.

The three parts of the universe are represented throughout the myth, especially as the characters move about the landscape. There is a repeated up/down movement: up into the forest to hunt and where Kaunala Tape meets Iputime—the woman from *ati kenga*, and down to the Hewa near the lower reaches of the Yongope river. This up/down movement has further dimensions of meaning, for "up" or "above" can represent dark, hot, death, mortality, bad, and taking. Human beings have *tombo*: find themselves "in between" these oppositions which can be summarized in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light/dark</td>
<td>Sun and bleached cliffs/Dark soil and gloomy depths of river valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold/hot</td>
<td>Frosts above 8,000 feet/Warm, tropical valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life/death</td>
<td>Sun is source of life/Spirits of dead reside in <em>yuu pango</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immortality/mortality</td>
<td>Sun is source of life/Spirits of dead reside in <em>yuu pango</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good/bad</td>
<td>Sun source of benefits/Spirits source of troubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving/taking</td>
<td>Sun and sky-people give (&quot;drop&quot;)/Spirits must be given to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other oppositions which are more geographical than cosmological are: lake/river, fallen tree/standing tree. A common feature with these is" one dimension/more than one dimension, or possibly, relating to the above: dead/alive. From these various oppositions it can be seen that the myth is open to a rich geographical and cosmological symbolism.

The degree to which this potential symbolism is active in its revealing/concealing function will become apparent in later stages when I deal with the meaning-function at deeper levels of the myth. The potential symbolism provides material for the "guesses" which must be made.
in entering the hermeneutical circle. Interaction with the results of structural analysis and probability judgements will bring the process of validation to full circle.

Social Symbolism

The systems of descent and kinship, and male-female relations are central to Ipili social symbolism. Descent is an ideal relationship between the living and the dead. An Ipili descent group is "one kind" (gane) in its origin (tene) from one ancestor. Kinship is a relationship between the living. Unlike the monism of descent, it is based on duality. Kinship locates an individual across descent groups, the individual standing "in between" (tombo) the groups whose tene (s)he takes through his or her parents. The number of "lines" the individual stands "in between," increases at the rate of $2^n$, where $n$ is the number of generations in the genealogy. After marriage the individual also stands "in between" the groups whose tene his or her spouse takes. Biersack calls Paiela kinship "a brilliant organizational metaphor of local biological theory." Male and female contrast as large/small, strong/weak, tall/short, decorated/undecorated, knowledgeable/stupid, hunter/cultivator, hard/soft, one/two. Alone, male or female are "neuter" and sterile. They become men and women in combination as complementary opposites in a reciprocal relationship. Together they form one mina (mina mindiki)--a combination of two constituents which is thereby powerful and fruitful. In one sense a child is a mina mindiki, its "bone" deriving from its father and its "skin" deriving from its mother. In another sense it is "neuter" until it develops the distinguishing characteristics of a marriageable man or woman.

Male-female relations are a primary concern of the surface narrative of the myth. Simply stated--it is about two brothers who find two women whom they marry. But these relations enter at the symbolic level also. In a sense the brothers at the beginning of the myth are incomplete, sterile. The two are brothers, sharing the same gane and so are socially indistinguishable. Kimape realized this and longed for a woman to complement his incompleteness (3). It is through his relations with the woman Iputime that Kaunala Tape becomes a "man." This is a recurring theme as Kaunala Tape defines himself variously within social relationships.
In relation to the Hewa he is defined as "child," being carried in a net bag (21). His hair is described as soft and fair like a child and several times he is called "small." In relation to his brother he is both young man and woman—killing the pig as a young man does, yet getting food from the garden (4) and cutting firewood and fetching water (1) like a woman. His brother puts the head and entrails of the pig (the parts given to women) on top of his house (6). In relation to Iputime he defines himself as child and man. He is like a child wanting to sleep in her house (13), and he lets her boss him about (14). He is like a man when he orders her to prepare food (12) and when he must sit in the man's side of the house while she gives him food and teases his hair (15). He is a "married man" when he encounters Iputime with her (his) child (25), and when they participate in domestic activities like cooking taro together (26) and eating pork together (29). The same theme of changing sexual identity is brought out through parallel symbolism in another version of the myth where the hero, Kimala, changes clothes with his sister, becomes a "woman" and "marries" the man from the Hewa. He changes his sexual identity four times in this fashion.

Except for their participation in the kepele ritual near the end, the ancestors of the brothers receive little attention and little importance is given to descent group relations. Kinship, coupled with male-female relations are central. In their relationship Kaunala Tape becomes a man and he and Iputime become one mina, standing "in between" their hypothetical lines. The number eight is significant. Iputime gives Kaunala Tape eight sweet potatoes, and as I will show in a later section, there are eight "journeys" in the myth. Eight is an ideal number in Ipili kinship: each person in a marriage relationship ideally having four patrilines and four matrilines. Pregnancy is said to last eight months. The union between Kaunala Tape and Iputime is fruitful, shown in their child, and symbolized in the power they have to change an old sickly pig into a large healthy one (30) (healthy pigs are the sure sign of a healthy marriage relationship).

Techno-Economic Symbolism

The techno-economic realm uses biological and cosmic metaphors like those above. People own the "ground bone" (yuu kulini) (below)
where the spirits of the dead reside. Kinsmen may exploit the "ground skin" (yuu umbuaini) (above): the land used for their houses and gardens. In a sense, one could say that the opposition of cleared to uncleared land is one of one/two dimensions: gardens, with sweet potato planted in raised mounds (not unlike women's breasts) being two dimensional. This may also be one significant difference between taro and snakes, the former being two dimensional in relation to the snake's one horizontal dimension. A further difference between these two is domestic/wild: a theme repeated symbolically in a number of ways. Some of the domestic/wild oppositions may be shown as follows:

- garden/forest
- dwelling/cave, tree base
- domestic pig/wild pig, cassowaries
- pig/wild possums
- sweet potato/sugar cane
- horticulture/hunting
- taro/snakes

Like the couple who have tombo, it is the fence (called a tombo) which mediates or is in between the domestic and the wild; between the cleared and the uncleared land. The dog may be a symbol of mediation, for it makes invisible, wild things visible by means of its sense of smell. Domestic things are controllable and "real" (enekeya) as opposed to wild things. A marriage payment must be of domestic animals and "real" things, given at midday, in a cleared place (vs. wild, dark, forest). That is why the Hewa asked if Kaunala Tape was really serious in offering wild pigs, cassowaries and possums (20). Married life continues as an exchange of real domestic (especially edible) things. As with sexual relations, the source of economic fertility is the functional interdependence of the couple as a mina mindiki pair.

**Psychic Symbolism**

Ricoeur proposed the psychoanalytic method of Freud for analyzing and interpreting oneiric (dream) symbolism as found in myth. I think the science of the mind can provide valuable insight, but as I noted previously (p. 37), I think there are advantages to following the analytic
psychologist Carl Jung. He is less reductionist than Freud, his method of interpretation is more in line with Ricoeur's method of looking for what the text is saying, and Jung's theory of the genesis of dream symbolism in the creativity of the unconscious, rather than in repressed experience has similarities to the "relational" approach to symbolism which I have been following.

Jung devoted a good amount of his attention to mythological material and has related this to symbols found in dreams. An important concern emerging through these studies was the process of "individuation" through which a person comes to terms with his or her unique self. This is a universal phenomenon. Jungian psychologist Jacobi says, "The symbolism of birth, life, and rebirth is part of the pattern of the individuation process. From the remotest times man has tries to express it in the imagery of myths and fairytales, in rituals and works of art, to capture the archetypal events in forms that are valid for all men." I was told that the myth under study is related to the Ipili man's initiation rites. Initiation rites have to do with achieving an adult identity, so it is quite possible that the process of individuation might be relevant to this analysis.

I will outline a few of the essential characteristics of Jung's theory. The diagram below helps illustrate Jung's idea of the conscious and unconscious in the human psyche.

![Diagram of the Human Psyche according to Jung](image)

The center of the field of consciousness, is the "ego," but the center of the psyche, made up of conscious and unconscious contents of the mind is the "soul" or inner "Self." The personal unconscious contains material such as repressed memories. The collective unconscious is a universal substrate containing suprapersonal material which is part of every human being. The process of individuation brings one into contact with all three strata, and so allows one to relate to the "Self" at the center of the psyche.
Symbols, the means by which unconscious contents can come to consciousness are manifest in dream and mythological material. The form of such symbols is determined by the personal experience and the culture of a person, but Jung has found motifs which commonly occur in these symbolic expressions. Symbols of "transcendence" commonly represent a person's striving to overcome the inertia of the unconscious mind. A common motif is that of the lonely journey of a hero figure, presided over by a feminine spirit of compassion. There are accompanying symbols of "transformation" as the hero encounters a new world in his lonely journey. Three commonly personalized representations of a motif are what Jung calls the "shadow," and the "anima" and "animus." The "shadow" represents little-known or repressed qualities of the ego. It is often represented as a "dark" figure of the same sex as the subject. The "anima" in males (the "animus" is the equivalent for females) is a function filtering through contents of the unconscious. The "anima" is personified as a female figure, often taking the role of guide or mediator to the world within. Von Franz says that there are commonly four stages in the development of the anima; from "Eve" (instinctual, biological) to "Helen" (romantic) to "Mary" (love and devotion) to "Sapientia" (transcendent, holy). Finally the "Self" the goal of the individuation process, is portrayed by symbols of wholeness: omnipresence, roundness, mandalas, and sometimes as a wise old man. If the text being studied is indeed connected with initiation, and if Jung is correct, then these motifs should appear in the myth. I will consider symbols for the motifs of the unconscious, transcendence, transformation, shadow, Self, and the anima.

The unconscious is the unknown, uncontrollable, "dark" side of the self. The forest and the wilderness of the Hewa region are surely symbols for the unconscious. The forest is the home of wild beasts and dangerous uncontrollable things. Other such symbols are the dark cave, and the lake, which hides unknown things beneath its surface. The dog, being a mediator between the known and unknown is an important symbol for the establishment of relations with the unconscious.

The prime symbol of transcendence is the lonely, arduous journey, which after various episodes, ends in the sky. The bird is similarly a
symbol of transcendence. Kaunala Tape wishes to take and wear its feathers (to "put on" its transcendence).

There are a number of symbols of transformation. At the beginning Kaunala Tape is a young boy (with undifferentiated consciousness). There is the painful separation from his brother (beginning of differentiation) then access to transforming food (17) so that he can be who he needs to be at any particular moment (an important aspect of the individuation process). Finally he becomes an adult married man and remains that way. Other symbols of transformation are the snake (which sheds its skin) and the fallen tree (commonly used as a bridge to "cross over" things).

The most obvious symbol of the shadow is the demon (24). It changes to a possum (also "dark," being a nocturnal animal), which becomes friendly and thus integrated and a companion on the quest. It is through this relation that he is able to ascend the high mountain with its "total" view—a symbol of wholeness or the "Self." Other symbols of the Self (fittingly at the climax of the story) are the old man (32), and theoko house, which is a large circular structure.

The "anima" figures are intriguing, for the hero encounters all four representations of stages of the development of the anima. The first girl whom he meets while hunting in the forest is like an "Eve" figure. He claims a relationship with this "anima" figure (11) ("I know you . . ."), and she follows him (activated "anima" wanting to relate). It appears that they are unable to relate satisfactorily until we encounter a symbol of integration in Iputime as his wife (26). The young Hewa girl is a "Helen" figure (she would like to marry him [19]). Later she is a dangerous devouring woman (21). The symbol of integration is when Kaunala Tape goes to the Hewa to take part in her bride price distribution (26). Iputime's sister is a "Virgin Mary" figure, trailing Kaunala Tape through the forest and sleeping on the other side of the tree from him (27). Kaunala Tape finds it difficult to relate to her also, until the symbol of integration in his presenting her with the pig's heart (31). The fourth "anima" figure is the mysterious woman ("Sapientia") encountered at the top of the mountain (32). This unidentified woman accompanies Kaunala Tape to the sky.
The details of the psychic symbolism above, combined with the other symbolic spheres show the richness of the symbolic dimension of the myth. Until now I have tried not to translate or rationalize the symbolism, but to describe it in its potential revealing/concealing function. I come now to the second procedure of the analysis in which I must make guesses at general themes in the complexity of the symbolism; guesses which may be validated through meanings discovered at a deeper level of analysis. These themes or codes (called schemata by Lévi-Strauss) provide the principles of selectivity for the symbolic meanings.

**Depth Semantics**

**Code: Known-Real/Unknown-Irreal**

A theme which is common through the many spheres of symbolism is the opposition known/unknown. Biersack describes this opposition, which is common throughout Ipili culture, as follows.

Known things are describable, they have qualities. Unknown things are nondescript, they have no qualities, or the only quality they have is their qualitylessness. Known and knowable things are paired and contrasted. The Paiela call them one mina (mina mindiki).²⁷

*Anda pene* is the knowable-known. The verb anda means both to see and know (seeing as comprehension). Knowable things, through their qualities are perceived by both the mind and the eyes. Unknowable things (*anda na pene*) (which may be material objects) are seen with the eyes only. Not being part of a qualitative pair they are indescribable and are comprehended as irreal. This distinction is relevant to my discussion of symbolism.

In the section on poetic symbolism I described two morphemes which indicate an "irreal" condition as opposed to a "real" (known, experienced, comprehended) one. A related theme is apparent in the cosmic and geographic symbolism. Human beings mediate the cosmic oppositions of "above" and "below." "Above is only light, cold, immortal, etc. The monistic qualitylessness of the "above" is illustrated by the sun and the moon. They are brother and sister; unmarried, thus do not form a mina mindiki pair. The sky people also are regarded as unmarried and unpaired.
"Below" is only bad, taking, etc. Like the "above," it too is monistic and so unknowable and thus irreal. Human beings are neither "above" nor "below," but "in the middle."^{28}

One finds a similar theme in the social symbolism. In his changing sexual identity Kaunala Tape is transformed from a boy (iwana) into an unmarried man (iwana mapokae) and into a married man (akali). As a boy he can walk about naked or with his apron worn carelessly. He is "just skin" and comparatively speaking is unknown or irreal. As a young man he must divide his upper and lower body with a belt (tombo), and conceal his lower (invisible, unknown) body with an apron and leaves, while allowing his upper body to be visible and known. The change from boy to man is one from monism to dualism. This is completed in the pairing of a higher order when he and Iputime become one mina. The triads may be shown in the following manner.\^{29}

![Social Triads Diagram]

Similarly, the domestic/wild opposition which characterizes the techno-economic symbolism, can be seen as a known/unknown opposition (see p. 52). A garden is real and known as compared to forest because it is two dimensional and the forest is part of the "above" and "below" unknown realms. Caves, bases of trees, and wild animals, are all found in the forest, not "in the middle" where people live. Sugar cane is irreal because, as opposed to sweet potato, it is food for children.

The process of individuation in psychic symbolism involves differentiation (monism to dualism) and the establishment of a relationship...
between the two parts, conscious and unconscious (known and unknown). The process may be shown schematically as follows.

unknown-irreal

\[ \downarrow \]

known-real

\[ \uparrow \]

conscious

unconscious

symbols of integration of shadow, anima, Self

Fig. 9. Psychic Triad

A summary of these processes is presented below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>poetic</th>
<th>real-known</th>
<th>irreal-unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cosmic-geog.</td>
<td>real</td>
<td>irreal (yale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social</td>
<td>in-between (tombo)</td>
<td>above-below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>techno-econ.</td>
<td>dual</td>
<td>single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>psychic</td>
<td>domestic</td>
<td>wild</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conscious</td>
<td>unconscious</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 10. Summary of Symbolic Processes

It may be seen that the code real-known/irreal-unknown, is helpful for finding and ordering meanings at the level of the depth semantics of the symbol. I will now test it further by means of a structural analysis of the mythic text as a whole.

Structural Analysis

A structural analysis comes out of the interaction of paradigmatic associations and syntagmatic chains, as I described previously in Chapter I. The schema on the following page shows the episodes of the story set out paradigmatically so as to reveal the structural logic. Lines I-VII are the episodes or syntagmatic chains. Columns a-j contain the elements in paradigmatic form.

The syntagmatic chains show evidence of a chiastic pattern with the man-woman relationship as the focus. As the story progresses there is a weakening of the oppositions of the chiastic pattern. Kaunala Tape,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I</th>
<th>Thinks of woman</th>
<th>Bird shows path of journeys</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II</th>
<th>Thinks of brother</th>
<th>Hunting in forest</th>
<th>Trial 1: Shoot deeper into bird of forest</th>
<th>Sleeps at base of tree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8-13</td>
<td>Hunting in forest</td>
<td>Trial 2: Falls down</td>
<td>Into possums</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>III</th>
<th>Hunting in forest</th>
<th>Trial 3: Find wild pigs possums cassowaries</th>
<th>Irreal marriage payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14-19</td>
<td>Hunting in forest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V</th>
<th>Hewa girl negates his exchange gift</th>
<th>Carried to Hewa</th>
<th>Trial 4: Escape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21-23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VI</th>
<th>Searching on mountain</th>
<th>Trial 5: Fight demon of possum</th>
<th>Top of mountain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VII</th>
<th>Journeys to Hewa young woman &quot;Mary&quot;</th>
<th>Trial 6: Avoid base of tree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27-29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VIII</th>
<th>Hunting in forest with dog</th>
<th>Trial 7: Raise healthy pigs (integration) of pig's heart</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30-32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 11. The Structure of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>f</th>
<th>g</th>
<th>h</th>
<th>i</th>
<th>j</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>Difficulty</td>
<td>Kaunala</td>
<td>Snakes vs Taro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Eve&quot;)</td>
<td>in</td>
<td>Tape: male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>first to help him become man</td>
<td>relating</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becomes man</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>Boy</td>
<td>Woman (&quot;Helen&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unable to relate</td>
<td></td>
<td>Snakes vs pork</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(wanted to marry)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becomes man</td>
<td>Reconciles</td>
<td>Boy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>brother</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hewa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becomes man</td>
<td>Iputime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>gone:</td>
<td></td>
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<td>unable to relate</td>
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<td>Whole world (=Self)</td>
<td>Wife: integration</td>
<td>Married man</td>
<td>Marriage payment at Taro</td>
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<td>Hewa: integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Becomes man</td>
<td>Domesticity: integration</td>
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<td>Eats pork</td>
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<td>oko house</td>
<td>Woman Sky</td>
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<tr>
<td>old man (=Self)</td>
<td>(&quot;Sapientia&quot;)</td>
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</table>
the mediator is gradually transformed so that by sequences VI - VIII, his identity (h) has become stable and the foods he eats are "real."

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{a Thinking} \\
&\quad \text{b c journey-trial} \\
&\quad \text{d e unknown-irreal} \\
&\quad \text{f man} \\
&\quad \text{g i man-woman relationship} \\
&\quad \text{h identity conflict} \\
&\quad \text{j real-irreal} \\
&\quad \text{a1 (journey)}
\end{align*}
\]

The paradigmatic series also reveals mediations transforming Kaunala Tape's identity. At first, in I-II, he is defined as small and "irreal" (iwana). He journeys above and below into the unknown, hunts "irreal" (wild) animals, eats "irreal" food (snakes), is paradoxically defined as both male and female, and has difficulties relating to anyone else. In III-V, he becomes iwana mapokae, still "irreal" in many respects. He still journeys alternately above and below, hunts wild animals and has difficulties relating, but after III he no longer eats "irreal" food, and the identity paradox has changed from male/female to young man/mature man. By VI he is a mature married man. He still journeys into the unknown, but with the help of a dog. He raises domestic animals (pigs) rather than going to hunt for wild animals, and eats "real" food (taro, pork). There is a resolution of the previous difficulties of relating with all three women (VI g, VII g, VIII d). This man-woman relationship shows a series of inversions and negations. In II g, Iputime beats Tapeyo over the head and then he pokes her in the breast. In III g, there is the paradox of Iputime tending to Tapeyo, but wishing she could marry his brother. In IV g, there is another inversion. Where before there had been a refusal of trade relations between Kimape and the Hewa, now there is the establishment of relations with Tapeyo as mediator. In V a, the Hewa girl negates these relations when she carries off Tapeyo in her netbag. There is a further inversion and establishment of relations when Kaunala Tape goes to contribute to the Hewa girl's marriage payment in VI i.
In the final section of the myth Kaunala Tape completes the life cycle. He leaves the land of the living on a final journey to ati kenga, the unknown place above.\(^{32}\)

**Conclusion: The Meaning**

To look for the meaning of the myth is to ask what the mythic text is saying. The "meaning-function" at the level of the logical structure can be seen in the transformations of the syntagmatic chains and the paradigmatic associations. In the first, the focus is upon the man-woman relationship. The second shows a transformation from a monistic world of innocence and "irreality" to a world of dualism, sexual identity and "reality." Together they say that the movement from the unknown irreality of childhood to the reality and knowledge of mature adulthood is found through human interaction. Thus the primary meaning of the myth is in the social and philosophical dimensions. This does not make the other dimensions irrelevant. They have their own relevance as well as their contribution to the dominant metaphors in the social and philosophical dimensions. I chose these dimensions, not arbitrarily, but because they exhibit a greater richness of structural meaning than the others. Lévi-Strauss says that "mythical thought always progresses from the awareness of oppositions toward their resolution."\(^{33}\) I have shown how many of the oppositions within the myth are resolved in the philosophical and social dimensions. If I focused on the socio-economic or the cosmological or the psychic dimensions, I might have shown how their symbolism could open up many valuable directions for thought. But the structural analysis at the level of the text as a whole shows that the primary meaning of the text does not lie in these dimensions. It is valid to say that the socio-economic dimension of the myth is about the division of labor and the resolution of domestic/wild, culture/nature oppositions; or to say that the psychic dimension of the myth is about individuation, and "ego" relating to "anima" in the discovery of the "Self." But to speak of the meaning of the text as a whole, one must refer to the social and philosophical dimensions.

This is where the "objectivity" of the semiotic method has proven useful. The text is open to many different readings, but through the mediation of structural analysis one may move beyond the surface and
subjective characteristics of the text and one may have a new perspective which enables one to choose between different readings. In the analysis, presuming that the myth is an instrument of communication, I looked first to the various "indices" (mostly symbols) through which meanings could be communicated. Then I investigated the "codes" by which these meanings might be ordered in patterned sets. I found the primary code to be the known-real vs the unknown-irreal. Then it was a matter of determining how and which indices were active in communicating meanings by means of the primary code. In this way I came to the conclusion that the basic meaning of the myth is concerned with the movement through human interaction, from the unknown irreality of childhood to the reality and knowledge of adulthood.

This basic message, though determined by abstract means, is not entirely divorced from the logic of actual life. People's lives are a reenactment of this drama in the movement from the irreality of timelessness and childhood to the reality of adulthood, the establishment of reciprocal relations with others, and the final return to the irreality of mortality. Perhaps I could have guessed this message from a "surface" reading of the text, but without the analysis I would not be aware of the richness of symbolism and structural logic contributing to this conclusion.

The understandings gained through the depth analysis will be important in the next chapter where the dynamics of meaning in the myth will open out into the new situation of a scriptural text. So far I have been acting on the text as an entity in itself. I will now ask how I can think from the text and how it can reveal new meanings in directions which it opens up for thought. New meanings in the world "in front of" the text will in turn actualize semantic virtualities in the mythic text itself.
CHAPTER IV
THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION

In the previous chapter, I investigated what the mythic text "said." Now in this final chapter I will look at "what it talks about;" what possible world it discloses and what directions it opens up for through in a new situation. Specifically, I will attempt a response to the question of how the Kaunala Tape myth can relate to the world of Christian theology. My method owes much to Ricoeur's hermeneutic. As shown in Chapter II, Fig. 2., the mediating function of a depth semantics reveals possibilities for the appropriation of new meanings. "hermeneutics begins where structural analysis leaves off, when the closure of meaning known by theoretical after-thought gives way to the opening up . . ."¹ I have looked at various symbolic meanings and now the symbols, out of their excess of meaning, call for speculative discourse, an interpretation, a "thinking more."

My method is independent of Ricoeur's in the procedure I will use to accomplish the semantic innovations. I propose to take a text from the Christian scriptural tradition and to begin a dialogue between this text and the mythic text of Kaunala Tape. The dialogue has two major purposes: firstly to allow the Kaunala Tape text to impinge on and speak to the world of Christian theology through a scriptural text, and secondly, to open up new meanings in the interpretation of the Kaunala Tape text itself.

The text from scripture which I have chosen is Genesis 1-4. There are several reasons for choosing this text rather than some other. Firstly, the fact that the early chapters of Genesis are commonly acknowledged as mythic material helps minimize the possibilities of a "category mistake": combining two very different types of material. Secondly, the early chapters of Genesis have been the subject of structural analysis, in many respects similar to my analysis of the myth in Chapter III.² Thirdly, there are a number of similarities and comparisons
in the symbolism, the codes and the message of the Kaunala Tape myth and the Genesis account, as I hope to show later in this chapter.

The similarities and differences are important for my method, especially in its utilization of metaphor. One may speak in symbol and metaphor. That is an essential part of myth, as I have analyzed in Chapter III. One may speak about metaphor and extend metaphors. That is hermeneutics and the thinking from symbols that Ricoeur proposes. But, as Pellauer has said, "... if good metaphors give rise to speculative discourse, speculative discourse, in turn may point the way to new, live metaphors." Thus one may also speak in metaphor about metaphor. This is a further step which I propose to illustrate in the dialogue between the two texts. Similarities between the texts will help to extend the meanings of the metaphors and symbols within the texts. But a comparison of the differences will create new tensions which may give rise to a semantic impertinence and a semantic innovation in metaphor as a way of resolving it. The tension between the "is" and the "is not" may give way to an "is like." Thus new meanings emerge which will form part of a local theology. If not new meanings, some will be new ways of expressing old meanings.

Genesis as Myth

In his article "Genesis as Myth" and an earlier version of the paper entitled, "Lévi-Strauss in the Garden of Eden," Edmund Leach divides Genesis 1-4 into three main sections: the creation account (1:1-2:3), the Garden of Eden story (2:4-4:1), and the section on Cain and Abel (4:2-4:16). He says that the creation account with its specifying of all living things as belonging to a limited number of precisely defined categories appeals to scholars of the functionalist school, whereas the story of the Garden of Eden, with the serpent, the tree and the fruit, appeals to the symbolists. But he says,

neither the symbolist nor the functionalist approaches can be considered adequate. Each tells us something but neither offers an answer to the total question: What is Genesis 1 to 4 all about?

However, if we now apply a Lévi-Strauss type of analysis, everything takes on a completely new shape; moreover it is a shape
that recurs in both parts of the story and is repeated again in a third form in the Cain and Abel story that follows.  

Through a very detailed process of argumentation, Leach arrives at a complex of oppositions which are summarized in the figure below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perfect Ideal categories</th>
<th>Confused Anomalous categories</th>
<th>Imperfect Real categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEAVEN</td>
<td>FIRMAMENT</td>
<td>EARTH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other world</td>
<td>sky</td>
<td>this world</td>
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<tr>
<td>Things by themselves</td>
<td></td>
<td>Things in pairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIGHT</td>
<td>DARKNESS</td>
<td>DAY+SUN</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAY</td>
<td>NIGHT</td>
<td>NIGHT+MOON</td>
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<tr>
<td>DUST</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life by itself</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>Life+Death</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immortality</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mortality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good by itself</td>
<td>Evil</td>
<td>Good+Evil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
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<td>Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONE RIVER</td>
<td></td>
<td>FOUR RIVERS</td>
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<td>Things whose seed</td>
<td>CREEPing THINGS</td>
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<tr>
<td>is in themselves</td>
<td>CATTLE</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEREALS FRUIT GRASS</td>
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<td>BEASTS</td>
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<td>Dust - MAN (by himself)</td>
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<td>ADAM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eve</td>
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<td>brother sister</td>
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<td>SERPENT</td>
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<td>incest</td>
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<td>Cereals</td>
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<td>EXPULSION FROM</td>
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<td>PARADISE</td>
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<td>EAST</td>
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<td>Beginning of real life</td>
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<td>Adam+Eve (as wife)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cain+wife</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Procreation</td>
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Fig. 12. Structure of Genesis according to Leach
Heaven is opposed to earth with the firmament (sky) forming a mediation between the two. Birds mediate the sky/land opposition, fish the freshwater/saltwater opposition, and vegetation the water/land opposition. The figure will be explained further later in this chapter.

Patterned sets of oppositions reveal the codes of incest/procreation, life (moving)/death (static), unity/duality; these being subsumed under the general categories of perfect-ideal/imperfect-real. Leach chooses a message about sexual rules and transgressions and says that the Genesis story in its contrast between the ideal situation in the garden and the real situation of life as it is, offers a way to deal with the paradox of a simultaneous commitment to a belief in descent from common ancestors and to a prohibition of incest. In the garden there is Yahweh God, life, and no sex. Outside the garden there is the opposite. "Isolated unitary categories such as man alone, life alone, one river, occur in ideal Paradise; in the real world things are multiple and divided; man needs a partner, woman; life has a partner, death." Leach concludes, "some may think it is too like a conjuring trick. For my part, I do find it interesting. All I have done here is to show that the component elements in some very familiar stories are in fact ordered in a pattern of which many have not been previously aware."

Leach's work has brought varied reactions. Lévi-Strauss regarded it as a joke. He said that Old Testament material is not suitable for structural analysis because we lack the necessary cultural data needed for the interpretation of Old Testament myths and because the myths in the Old Testament have been distorted too much by later interpreters. Replying that Lévi-Strauss is too cautious, Leach's very starting point is Ricoeur's criticism that Lévi-Strauss has not analyzed Old Testament myths. Leach asserts that even though the Biblical tradition has been subjected to editorial revision, this will not affect structural analysis. "To assess these structures we do not need to know how the particular stories came to assume their present form nor the dates at which they were written."

Statements like the above have brought criticism from biblical scholars because it appears to devalue their contribution to the study of the Old Testament. Some, like R.C. Culley, have difficulty with
the methods of structuralism itself. J.A. Emerton, while allowing that "Leach has performed a useful service to biblical scholars," finds a difficulty with the "intended" message conflicting with the message found by structural analysis. Similarly, J. Rogerson points to "structural" similarities which are deliberate and theological, having nothing to do with myth in a Lévi-Strauss sense. For instance the instructions of God to Noah in Genesis 9:1-7 closely resemble those to Adam in Genesis 1:27-30 because both passages are by the priestly writer who sees Noah as a new beginning after the flood and so deliberately makes God's instructions to him resemble those to Adam.

I will not disregard historical and critical studies, but neither will I regard these as the only correct and always valid method of biblical interpretation. Claus Westermann says,

One time it was on the basis of timeless and valid dogmatics, the other time it was because of a dogmatical concept of history... The time of these two extremes is over, and now begins the laborious task of asking step by step what actually the Old Testament itself is saying in its texts about the relation between the Word of God and history.\(^\text{19}\)

Structuralism makes an important contribution to understanding what the Old Testament itself "is saying."\(^\text{20}\)

**Genesis as Scripture**

From the perspective of the student of scripture, the book of Genesis is a book of origins, the origin and history of a tribe of God's people presented as the saving action of the same God who created the world. The source of biblical reflection on the creation lies in oral tradition: people told stories about it. As Claus Westermann says, "The narratives in Genesis were not composed; they grew."\(^\text{21}\) The first segment, Genesis 1-11 is a preface to the patriarchical story. Commentators, stressing the unity of the segment, point out that to separate chapters 1-3 from chapters 4-11 is to risk misunderstanding them.\(^\text{22}\) Owing to restrictions of space these comments will focus on chapters 1-4, though there will be occasional references to material in chapters 5-11.

Literary critical examination has revealed three major sources to Genesis: J (Yahwist), P (Priestly, E(Elohist), and also R(redactor).\(^\text{23}\) The first two are relevant to the study of Genesis 1-11. The
Yahwist source was written in the tenth or ninth century B.C. when the author reworked the traditions of Israel from the Tribal Confederacy to make them relevant to the Davidic era; describing who they were by how they had come to be. One distinguishing feature of this source is the use of the name Yahweh for God, even on the lips of non-Israelites (4:26). Another distinctive trait is the way the Yahwist appropriated traditions paralleled in the myths of the ancient Near East. The themes of tree of life, the cunning serpent and the flood are found in ancient popular tradition. Yet the Yahwist's interpretation of these themes is based on the faith of the covenant community. The Priestly source, from the fifth century B.C., reflects the concerns of the exilic and post-exilic community which updated Israel's traditions for the restored Jerusalem temple. Like the J source, P uses materials from Near Eastern sources, but it also transforms them in its measured formulaic style and in its hard-line monotheism. The heavens declare the glory of the creator (Elohim), but He is not part or a process of his creation.

Genesis 1-4 divides into three principle sections. The first account of creation (1:1-2:4a) is attributed to the Priestly author. God created (bara) through his word which gives birth (toledot) to the heavens and the earth and all that is in them. Bara, used in the Old Testament only with God as subject, carries a meaning of divine mercy and saving action. The eight creation events fitted into six days are evidence that the writer was reshaping an older creation tradition. The writer has a particular liking for pairs: heaven and earth (v.1), earth and the abyss (v.2), etc. Something new is added with the creation of the animals (v.20). Living beings are "blessed" with the power to propagate their own kind. With the creation of humankind (species = male and female) there is a further difference. What was merely commanded of the beasts becomes a form of conversation between God and Man as God's image. At the end God saw that all He had made was very good, good in a sense of praise: joy expressing itself in speech.

In the second account of creation and the fall (2:4b-3:24), attributed to the Yahwist writer, the focus is more upon the creation of humankind in the primordial couple Adam and Eve. Two originally independent stories have been blended together. One tells how Man was created as a living being to till the soil. Vegetation appears, including
the "tree of knowledge of good and evil," the fruit of which Man is forbidden to eat. The animals are created and one of these, a serpent, precipitates the temptation which leads to Man's contravention of God's prohibition and the consequent curse with an end to the intended harmony of nature. Woven into this story is another in which God plants a garden in which he places a man whom he has formed from the earth. In the midst of the garden is the "tree of Life." God tried to make up for the man's incompleteness by creating the animals, but they were not adequate. God then completed his creation by making a woman out of the man's rib and he welcomed her with joy. Something happened which led eventually to their banishment from the garden and from the tree of life thus taking from them the opportunity of immortality.

The third section (4:1-26) is the Yahwist story of Cain and Abel. Though said to be sons of the first pair, it is obvious with reference to other people and organized society that they are not the immediate descendants of the first man and woman. There are obvious connections between this and the previous story for it too tells of weakness in the face of temptation, God's questioning of the offender and the banishment from God's presence. Westermann says, "If the Fall is seen only in chapter 3, then there must be distortion of biblical teaching ... the one-sided emphasis given to chapter 3 has made a substantial contribution to the far too individualistic understanding of sin in church teaching and practice."

The orthodox theological interpretation given to these first chapters of Genesis is one having to do with life, not only as it was in the beginning but as it is now. Humanity is a special part of God's creation, existing in relationship to God, nature and other human beings. Men and women experience both hidden potential as well as limits of fallibility and a life that ends in death. Humanity (expelled from the Garden) experiences God as far off and yet experiences his blessing from his saving action in creation and recreation. The message has been built up from many parts and some must wonder: Why two accounts of first creation and two (and more) accounts of human weakness in the face of temptation? This is where the structuralist can provide a helpful response: the different accounts are necessary if the text is really to tell the story. In the "redundancy" of the text, even though the details vary,
each alternative version confirms the reader's understanding and reinforces the essential meaning of all the others so that the structural patterns are "felt" to be present, conveying meaning much as poetry conveys meaning. 35

Kaunala Tape and Genesis

There may be some "surface" similarities between the myth of Kaunala Tape and Genesis 1-4. For example both concern origins ("When the ground and water began . . ." "When God created the heavens . . .") Both feature a primordial couple. Both have to do with horticulture and animals, including snakes. However I am not so much concerned with surface similarities or necessarily with similarities at all. I have learned from Ricoeur that comparison at the level of surface narrative is comparing secondary symbols which are already interpretations of primary symbols. My concern is to compare similarities and contrasts at the level of primary symbols, codes and messages which form part of the depth semantics of the myths.

There are some obvious similarities on the level of the codes. In Kaunala Tape there is the unknown-irreal vs the known-real. In Genesis there is the perfect-ideal vs the imperfect-real (see fig. 12). The irreal and ideal compare easily. The known and the imperfect contrast. Having the "structure" of the Genesis story it is possible to "read" it backwards or forwards. I will begin by reading it backwards, first according to the metonymic irreal-ideal comparison and second using the known/imperfect contrast in the metaphor: known = imperfect.

An irreal-ideal comparison in the Genesis story can lead one to interpret "knowledge" in a way different from various traditional interpretations such as: omniscience, moral discrimination, moral dependence, carnal knowledge, etc. If the knowledge represented by the tree of knowledge of good and evil is knowledge of what is "real": that which can be experienced, is visible, paired, and contrasted: with qualities; then the state of being without knowledge would be one of "irreality," and the Garden of Eden would be a place of the unknown and the irreal. Light or darkness or goodness by themselves are ideal categories. In reality they exist only in pairs: day and sun, light and moon, good and evil (see fig. 12). The state of the unknown-irreal is conceivable only in relation to the known-real, as Ricoeur says,
If now we ask the meaning of the innocence which the myth projects as a "before," we can answer: to say it is lost is still to say something about it; it is to posit it in order at least to cancel it . . . it is thought of to the extent of being posited, but it is not known; . . . 36

This interpretation of the state "prior" to the Fall as a state of unknown-irreal allows us to see the Fall itself from a new perspective. It opens possibilities for seeing it not as an event of history but as a state of being; i.e., no longer successive, but superimposed. Westermann writes similarly:

The title "Fall," which goes back to late Jewish interpretation, suggests that man was created on a definite plane, that through the sin of one individual the whole of mankind, so to speak, "fell" to a lower plane, and that all subsequent history was played out on this lower plane right up to the time of Christ. But this is to deal rough-handedly with the biblical data. The account of the origins shows in great depth and with great clarity that it belongs to man's very state as a creature that he is defective. 37

I think material from the Kaunala Tape myth can provide alternative explanations which support this view.

Take for instance the metaphor of known = imperfect formed from a contrast in the codes of Kaunala Tape and Genesis. The imperfect is divided, paired, mortal and real. We have seen in Kaunala Tape that the real is such only in relation to its opposite. So, logically the perfect is unity, singular, immortal, irreal—and unknown (using the formula known = imperfect). Thus it follows that seeking knowledge is the issue in Adam and Eve's movement from the perfect Garden to the imperfect world. In eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge, the serpent's prediction is borne out; their eyes are opened and they come to know good and evil. In this sense they become like God.

God is important in His ambiguous role in both the real and ideal worlds. In the real world Adam and Eve are like the real (but distant) God in their knowledge of good and evil. What about God in the ideal Garden, in whose "image" they are said to be made? The ideal Garden is a place of opposites. For instance, it is logical that there the woman should come out of the man, whereas it is the other way around in the real world. 38 But from the perspective of the known-real, God would be unknown-irreal in the Garden. How can that be? Perhaps some of the insights from
the psychological symbolism in Kaunala Tape can give a clue. There is not the same discovery of the individual Self in Genesis as in Kaunala Tape, but reading the myth backwards, could the God of the unknown-irreal be the Self; the imago Dei of the unknown-unconscious? Jung's imago Dei, thought of initially as a symbol for the impersonal unconscious as such and later as an unconscious projection of an archetype from the personal and collective unconscious, is symbolized by totality, wholeness, unity: the qualities of the perfect-ideal realm of fig. 12. If it is true that Adam, as the image of God, is the unknown Self, then the so-called "fall" is the realization that the Self as the imago Dei will forever be part of the unknown, seen only through symbols. Despite their ideals they will never know perfection, wholeness, totality, unity in themselves; they will never truly believe that they are made in the image of God. It means that they come to know themselves as both good and evil (3:22), as limited; getting food from the soil from which they were made through toil and suffering (3:17), and giving birth in pain (3:16). They will never be fully true to themselves, always falling short of the mark (= sin). This may not be a totally new view of the Fall, but it illustrates how the imperfect = known metaphor provides a new way of speaking about it, in line with the code from Kaunala Tape.

Besides the imperfect = known metaphor from the codes, the Kaunala Tape myth suggests further alternative explanations along the lines of development and differentiation. Part of the message of Kaunala Tape concerns growth from childhood to adulthood; from undifferentiated wholeness to differentiated wholeness. Suppose Adam and Eve gained this sort of knowledge: the knowledge of what it means to be an adult in a real world. Suppose they were seen, not as popular art depicts them, as adults; but like in the Kaunala Tape myth: as children. Such a way of thinking is not totally foreign to Christian scholars. For instance we find in Irenaeus,

... the man, was a little one; for he was a child and had need to grow so as to come to his full perfection ... But the man was a little one, and his discretion still undeveloped, wherefore also he was easily misled by the deceiver.40
Again, in the writings of Clement of Alexandria, Adam is called *pais tou Theou* (God's infant) and Clement says that in the fall Adam became a grown man by his disobedience (*ho pais andrizomenos apeitheiai*). 41

This interpretation which views Adam and Eve as childlike innocents in the Garden is attractive in that it preserves the successive mythic quality while interpreting the material. In becoming real they become adults with all that entails. Duality is one of the most important qualities of adulthood in the Kaunala Tape myth. If Adam and Eve were like children in the Garden, then they would not need to have clothing. As boy and girl they would be "just skin," with no significant sexual difference; monistic, like God. Only once differentiated sexually as adults, contrasting "above" and "below," would they feel shame in their nakedness, in revealing to each other what should be invisible.

Aware of their sexual difference, Adam and Eve are able to enter the fruitful union which is the fulfillment of their blessing by God. God's first commandment to them is "increase and multiply," yet ironically this is not possible in the unitary world of primal innocence. It is almost as though God, in his blessing, was destining them to leave Eden. Leach points out that this is the paradox at the root of the Genesis story, a paradox which has the same structure as the basic religious question. In its idea of a place for the dead where life is perpetual, religious Man denies the inevitability of the binary linkage life/death, and then seeks to establish relations between their world and the "other world." Likewise, in their idea of a place of primal innocence where the first people were of one kind, and another place where they are of different kinds, people find a basis for the rules of incest and exogamy, viewing some people as "our kind" and others as "other kind." The problem becomes how to establish relations between their kind and the other kind. As children, like brother and sister, Adam and Eve are one kind. As adults outside of the garden, they may enter a *mina mindiki* union: a productive pair of complementary opposites. Such a union is powerful and fruitful. Adam and Eve as adults are creative. Perhaps temptation in these circumstances is to take creation fully into their own hands; to decide that they have the power over life and death (as did Cain). Essentially their creativity is something "good," but
when combined with their limitation, their inward dividedness, their falling short of the mark; it can become "evil." In the goodness of God's original blessing continuing to be effective in their fertile union, and in the evil of their human limitation and creaturely defectiveness, lies the paradox of the reality of the fruits of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

Paired relations help explain not only Adam and Eve's creative union, but other relations, for example the puzzling relations of the different trees in the garden: the tree of Life and the tree of knowledge of good and evil. The myth of Kaunala Tape helps bring this into a new perspective. In the myth there is a relationship between sky, valley, and yuu kenga or the tombo: above, below, and "in the middle." They contrast as a pair of binary opposites and a "real" paired combination of both. Binary opposites with a similar structure in the Genesis story are: life/death and a life and death pair, good/evil and a good and evil pair (see figure 12). The relationship is illustrated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>irreal</th>
<th>irreal (opposite)</th>
<th>real (combination)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sky</td>
<td>valley</td>
<td>tombo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>life</td>
<td>death</td>
<td>life and death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>good</td>
<td>evil</td>
<td>good and evil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 13. Binary Opposites

In the Garden, life and immortality are symbolized in the tree of Life. In the irreal state of immortality it is not necessary to forbid them to eat from that tree. They participate already in what it symbolizes. But to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil is to eat of something "real" in the same way as the life and death pair are real; hence the prohibition. When they do eat and come to a knowledge of good and evil and of the reality of sexual difference, then the cycle of birth and death can begin. It is at this point, having entered the cycle of life and death, that their relationship to the tree of Life becomes important once more (3:24). Once part of the human life-cycle they cannot gain immortality and so they cannot remain in the Garden where
the tree of Life is growing. In the cycle of life and death they will return to dust: the "irreality" not of immortality, but of death.

Here we see one of the reasons for the transition from Eden to the world. In their change of state with the eating of the fruit, their remaining in the Garden of Eden becomes a contradiction and so they must go. There is a similar process to be seen in the visible/invisible opposition. As children and "just skin" they are not a duality of male and female in the unitary world of Eden. Once differentiated, they feel they must make part of themselves invisible. They hide "part" of themselves, and then almost immediately try to hide "all" of themselves among the trees of the Garden. Now that they have become real in their sexual awakening they are out of place in a unitary ideal world of God and the Garden. They can be "visible" only in an imperfect real world of pain and toil and so that is where they end up.

Another reason for their transition is their entering into relations with different mediators. This is illustrated in the figure below.

**Kaunala Tape**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>irreal</th>
<th>transformation</th>
<th>edible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taro</td>
<td>Woman and</td>
<td>snakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>snakes</td>
<td>sweet potato</td>
<td>Taro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

wild (hunter)  domestic (cultivator)

**Genesis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>inedible</th>
<th>transformation</th>
<th>edible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tree of knowledge</td>
<td>Serpent and fruit</td>
<td>cereals, fruit grass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fruit</td>
<td></td>
<td>wild plants meat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

domestic  wild

Fig. 14. Edible/Inedible Mediations

In each case there is an inversion of real and irreal foods through entering into relations with a symbol of transformation. In Kaunala Tape it is in the journeys, the woman, and eating the sweet potato she gives, which bring about the change. In Genesis it is the listening to and acting on the words of the serpent which bring about
the change. Kaunala Tape helps us see the possibility of the serpent as food (= transforming food?). More obvious is the structural position of the serpent as an anomalous creature (see Fig. 12), reinforced by the ambiguity of it being a creature that speaks. The serpent, the chthonic creature may be a symbol of chaos and evil also. If thought of as adults, then Adam and Eve would have some choice in whether to enter into relations with this symbol of transformation and of evil outside of themselves. But if considered to be children then they have little choice about entering relations with the serpent when it presents something "desirable, good to eat and pleasing to the eye." Only having participated in the drama of relations with the serpent, the symbol of transformation, and consequently having changed and entered the imperfect real world as adults do they have power over all the creatures including the serpent. There the offspring of the woman will crush the serpent's head (3:15).

Fig. 14 above shows that the transformations were different in the domestic/wild and hunter/cultivator dimensions. In Kaunala Tape the transformation is from wild to domestic, hunter to cultivator. Having lived out both these dimensions, Kaunala Tape enters the realm of immortality in the sky and the myth comes to an abrupt close. In Genesis the transformation is from domestic to wild, cultivator to hunter. Adam and Eve begin in Paradise (= a fenced orchard) and change to a world of work and toil where they will eat wild plants (3:18). Also God gives them animal skins to wear and Cain kills livestock, indicating a change from vegetarian to meat eating habits (cultivator → hunter). The transformations are different and so are the endings, for Genesis does not end with ch. 3, or ch. 11 for that matter. The story is repeated in Cain and Abel, then there is the flood and the story begins over again. The theme of salvation (the ending of Kaunala Tape), while not absent from the Creation story has to be developed through the Old Testament. Only in the New Testament does it come to completion with Jesus as the new Adam and as the Lamb of God and the Bread of life reconciling what Cain and Abel represent.
Genesis and Kaunala Tape

In the previous section I investigated some of the ways the myth of Kaunala Tape could speak to Genesis 1-4, leading to a "thinking more" based largely upon the symbolic meanings of the myth. I understand that a genuine local theology necessitates a dialogue between culture and the Good News. Culture shapes the presentation of the Good News, which in turn brings about transformations in its encounter with the culture. I will not investigate whether Genesis can open up some new meanings in the interpretation of the Kaunala Tape text giving a broader theological base to the interpretation. Due to length limitations of this chapter I will direct my comments to just two areas: consequences of the perfect-ideal and unknown-irreal comparison, and added dimensions to the childhood-adulthood movement.

To suggest the metaphor known-real = imperfect-real would not seem very puzzling. Though the known is considered "good" in the sense of desirable, it might in its duality be thought of as imperfect. But to change the metaphor to unknown-irreal = perfect-ideal is indeed puzzling because it goes quite contrary to the values in Kaunala Tape where the unknown-irreal is thought of as monistic, sterile and undesirable. Thus Genesis 1-4, if taken seriously, would likely confront Kaunala Tape with a reversal of values. It challenges my interpretation of it being a myth with a "natural" theology of hope: growing and becoming an adult with all that entails is desirable. There are three possible solutions to this challenge. Firstly, my previous interpretation of the myth may be wrong; which I doubt. Secondly, perhaps it is right that Genesis presents a reversal of the values of Kaunala Tape because over time it may prove to be a constructive tension; something I prefer not to pass judgement on at this point. Thirdly, learning from some of the conclusions to the previous section, perhaps Genesis is only part of the "story." I prefer this third alternative. Genesis, without the "Good News" in the sense of Jesus and the New Testament is the "sad" news. Only in conjunction with the Good News does Genesis offer a hopeful challenge.

I will now turn to my second point: added dimensions to the childhood-adulthood movement. The Genesis story draws attention to two
oppositions present yet not greatly emphasized in Kaunala Tape: the "moral" opposition of good/evil, and the "religious" opposition of life/death.

Previously, good and evil had to do with benefits and troubles in the cosmic sphere, fertility and sterility in the social sphere, and "real" and "irreal" things in the techno-economic sphere. Genesis challenges and modifies this conception. Indeed the traditional interpretation of Genesis (perfect-ideal = good, imperfect-real = bad) seems the reversal of Kaunala Tape (unknown-irreal = bad, known-real = good) in this respect. I think that the reversal helps to bring out an aspect of adulthood given little attention in Kaunala Tape; the question of a moral as well as a physical and psychic differentiation. With moral differentiation there is responsibility and increased capacity to choose good or evil. For instance it would add to the message of the myth that the movement from the unknown irreality of childhood to the reality and knowledge of adulthood is through human interaction "with the right [good] categories of people." Such human interaction would be "bad" if it offended against the incest taboo. Kaunala Tape does not have to deal with a brother-sister relationship in the same way as in Genesis, but proper relationships do enter in. For instance the girl ("Mary") he runs away from in the forest (whom he thinks is his brother's wife's sister) turns out to be his wife's sister. It is allowable (though not common) for two brothers to marry two sisters, but it would be improper for one man to marry two sisters. In running away Kaunala Tape made a choice which turned out to be a very responsible one.

The life/death theme in Genesis broadens the mortality/immortality symbolism in Kaunala Tape. The personages face very different ends. Kaunala Tape, in ascending to the irreal immortality of the sky, avoids the reality of death. Adam and Eve will die and return to the dust from which they came. The question of death and the role of a supreme being gives Genesis an added cosmic dimension and raises several questions about the myth and religious experience. In my analysis of Kaunala Tape I showed how the hero encounters symbols of wholeness and totality: symbols of the Self. Then in reflecting on Genesis I noted how the wholeness and totality which reflects the imago Dei, is unattainable in the Adam and Eve story. This leads me to enquire about the religious experience in
Kaunala Tape. How was he (like the initiates and the kachinas of my
Introduction) able to perceive and appreciate the Self as imago Dei in
the depths of the psyche as a symbol of the sacred and of mystery ex-
tending beyond its human manifestations? The process of individuation
is very important for the development of the faculty for symbolic con-
sciousness: being open to a world beyond one's rational consciousness.
In this sense, says psychologist Jacobi, the outcome of the individuation
process is an attitude "that one can rightly call 'religious' in the
proper sense of the word."42 Perhaps Genesis, with the question of death
and with the supreme being, help draw out previously neglected "re-
ligious" implications in Kaunala Tape. Dying and rising as themes
commonly found in initiation rites and their accompanying myths, so surely
the question of the reality of life and death can be relevant to Kaunala
Tape.43 To what extent can initiates identify with Kaunala Tape and his
fate? In addition, from the comments above on moral choice, there is the
question of freedom and necessity in relation to life and death. These
questions opened up by Genesis are ways that the Christian scriptural
tradition can help give a broader theological basis to the dialogical
interpretation of the myth of Kaunala Tape.

Implications

A theme through this chapter is that a person familiar with the
myth of Kaunala Tape will very likely read Genesis 1-4 as a story about
the first people and the inevitability of growing up rather than as a
story of the Fall. From their perspective they will remember it as a
story about two young people who through eating "real" fruit offered by
the serpent, come to the "real" knowledge of what it means to be an adult
in the world: a world of imperfection, dividedness, toil and pain, birth
and death. The pair will be remembered as growing and realizing their
duality and difference, and then entering into a fruitful creative union,
blessed by God. Thus they take into their own hands, power over life and
death. They will be remembered as having to face the reality of death and
their return to the unknown-irreality of the dust from which they came.
Having read Genesis, people might also reflect upon their own culture; on
hope, on responsible choice, especially with regard to marriage, and on
the certainty of their own death when their body returns to dust and their
spirit (talepa) joins those in the underworld. They might also wonder
what mysterious and unknown power controls life and death, and reflect
upon their relation to that power. These are just some of the impli-
cations which I have drawn from a dialogue between Kaunala Tape and
Genesis 1-4.

Does Kaunala Tape lead one to misunderstand Genesis? Do the
ideas above reflect a "wrong" interpretation of the story? I readily
admit that there is more to the interpretation of Genesis than I have
given, but that does not make the interpretation wrong. In fact my
focus has been not so much on the interpretation of Genesis, as the
interpretation of the myth of Kaunala Tape. I have tried to answer the
question of what Kaunala Tape can "say" to the world of Christian theology.
Within the limits of four chapters from the scriptural tradition the myth
has said that there are possible interpretations of Genesis 1-4 other
than the Creation and Fall, and indicated what one of these possible in-
terpretations might be. I will now show how this has further impli-
cations for the theological tradition and Christian practice.

In a previous quotation (p.77), Westermann noted that the Fall
interpretation goes back to the late Jewish era. Paul takes it up in
Romans 5:12-21 where he writes of the sin and death which entered the
world through one man's fall being righted by Jesus Christ. Church
teaching on peccatum originale, as the consequence of the Fall goes back
particularly to the writings of Augustine, especially his Contra Julianum.
Augustine thought original sin, manifest in concupiscence, stemmed from
the sin of Adam and Eve, and was transmitted through generations in the
libido of the sexual act. Augustine did not work out the intrinsic dif-
ference between original and personal sin because the consequences in
the next world were the same. More recent thinking has given attention
to this difference and to original sin as an absence of grace.

Kaunala Tape suggests a developmental interpretation of the Genesis
text as an alternative to the Fall. Imperfection, dividedness, pain, and
good and evil are part of the reality of the human situation. People
gradually come out of their ideal worlds to discover this as they mature
in their life situation. This realization, though painful, is good in many
respects, almost like the "O felix culpa," sung in the Easter proclamation
(Exsultet) of the Easter Vigil liturgy.
This view has implications for Christian practice. Consider one example: the practice of Baptism. The "common piety" understanding of Baptism is that it "washes away" original sin. But there is a trend in theological circles towards seeing Baptism more in terms of Christian initiation. The interpretation of Genesis using Kaunala Tape means that Genesis (the text commonly used to support the "original sin" approach to Baptism) can support the view of Baptism as Christian initiation. Baptism can be seen as a rite which recognizes people's inability to cope with their imperfection and dividedness alone. It can be seen as a rite by which one enters a community of faith that will sustain one on the journey from undifferentiated to differentiated wholeness. It can be seen as a rite by which one enters the body of Christ, committing oneself to Christ as the one who can guide one to wholeness. Such a view of Christian initiation brings the sacraments of Confirmation and Baptism together as they were in the Early Church. This interpretation of Christian initiation has implications for our view of the Incarnation: Jesus entering our dividedness to give us the hope that the evil and death encountered are not all there is. In a sense, Jesus turns Genesis into eschatology, so that our incompleteness is not so much a result of what was, as a sign of what is to come. This is to see Creation as only the beginning of a redemptive process continued in Jesus Christ.

The theological implications of Kaunala Tape speaking to Genesis could be many. I have indicated a few areas which no doubt could be fruitfully pursued at greater length, for they touch issues at the heart of Christian faith and practice. What I have tried to do is to show in a limited way how such pursuits can result in a theology more suited to, and containing features unique to, the people who know the myth of Kaunala Tape as their own story.
CONCLUSION

To pursue my overall theme of the common study of beliefs and meanings posed by the issues of ideology and myth would require some account of current work in theological and other hermeneutics, or any of Ricoeur's work on symbolism, or of the Jungian tradition --any one of which would unduly strain the limits of a single paper. (A. Cunningham in "Myth, Ideology, and Lévi-Strauss: The problem of the Genesis story in the nineteenth century." The Theory of Myth, pp. 171-72.)

I have found through experience that Adrian Cunningham is not exaggerating in his estimation of the immensity of the task which faces a person attempting to treat the meaning of myths, hermeneutics, Ricoeur's symbolism, and Jungian thought. In addition to these I have included structuralism and biblical studies; all in the space of a hundred pages. Any one of these could make a study in itself, yet to leave out any of the fields above would mean not tackling the task in sufficient breadth. Throughout, I have tried to keep a balance between depth and breadth, considering the limitations of space at my disposal.

The task which I set myself at the beginning was to investigate attitudes to mythic-symbolic material and to come to an understanding of myth in a way fruitful for theological reflection. Starting with culture, I traced developments in attitudes to culture, religion and myth and then summarized the more recent contributions of Victor Turner, Clifford Geertz, and Claude Lévi-Strauss. These three, in their own ways, have renewed interest in the meaning of cultural features and have treated myth as a symbolic mode of discourse. Lévi-Strauss's theory, based upon a linguistic model, has been most influential in the recent development of myth analysis.

Though many have criticized Lévi-Strauss in his approach and his arguments, Paul Ricoeur especially, is one who has critiqued him constructively. Ricoeur claims that it is possible to use Lévi-Strauss's methods to explain myth, and then to go beyond these in a search for meaning which leads to a depth interpretation and new understandings. It
is especially in the mechanisms of symbol and metaphor where the surplus of meaning transcends the linguistic sign, that the need for interpretation and not merely explanation is felt more acutely.

Out of my summary of Ricoeur's hermeneutics in Chapter II: his attitude to mythic-symbolic language as necessary and valid, his theory of discourse reduced to writing in the "text," and his approach to symbol and metaphor; and using some insights from Turner and Geertz, I developed a method by which I could interpret an Ipili myth. Ricoeur's ideas were especially helpful for clarifying the different functions of primary symbol within myth (secondary symbol), and in the philosophical dimension of the incorporation of believing and understanding in the hermeneutical circle.

In Chapter III, I tested the method on the myth of Kaunala Tape. Ideas from Jungian psychology proved helpful in interpreting the psychic symbolism. Out of the various spheres of symbolism I concluded that a common theme was a known-real/unknown-irreal code. A structural analysis showed that many of the oppositions in the myth were resolved in the philosophical and social dimensions. Thus I concluded that the primary message of the myth was concerned with the movement through human interaction, from the unknown-irreality of childhood to the reality and knowledge of adulthood.

In the final chapter, thinking "from" the mythic text, I explored some of the dynamics of meaning in the Kaunala Tape myth. I investigated how a dialogue at the level of primary symbols, codes and messages between Kaunala Tape and Genesis 1-4 might open up new directions for thought, both in the scriptural text and in the Kaunala Tape myth. I used a structural analysis of Genesis by Edmund Leach and showed how similarities between the texts helped extend the meanings of the texts whilst contrasts led to semantic innovations as ways to resolve the differences. I showed how a person familiar with the myth of Kaunala Tape might easily read Genesis 1-4, not as a story of the Fall, as it is traditionally interpreted, but as a story about the inevitability of growing up and coming to the "real" knowledge of what it means to be an adult in the world. Such an interpretation may contribute to the theological tradition and to Christian practice; for instance in a developmental idea of "original sin," a view of Baptism (and Confirmation) as Christian initiation
rather than ridding one of "original sin," and a vision of Creation as only the beginning of a redemptive process continued in Jesus Christ.

I think this study has implications for theological studies in general. I will list only four, though these certainly do not exhaust the possibilities. Firstly, I have shown that one may use indigenous mythology as a valid and fruitful base from which to develop a local theology; a theology which begins with the unique cultural experience of a people. Secondly, I have illustrated how coming from outside of the framework of traditional theology, one may develop or support different ideas and insights, useful, and indeed important, for the Christian theological tradition as a whole. Thirdly, I have shown how theology need not take the analytic form most common today, but that it may usefully employ methods found valuable in past tradition. The theology in this work has taken the form of a commentary on scripture; a form common in the early centuries of the Church, especially in the Western wisdom tradition of Augustine and the Patristics. Finally, I have demonstrated the importance of a broad approach to developing local theologies; incorporating the findings of various other sciences, especially anthropology.

One might wonder how my approach to mythic material relates to the "problem" of syncretism. Does not my method result in an untenable syncretistic understanding; an amalgam of Christianity and Paganism? My method does lead to a syncretism, but I do not think that it is necessarily untenable or undesirable. A genuine local theology must differ from Western Christian forms and there will be a tension between the culture and the broader Christian tradition. This is part of being "local" yet "universal" at the same time. Jesus himself is a model here; God working within history in the Incarnation. Where the Gospel transforms the culture and the culture shapes the presentation of the Gospel, there will be syncretism. However I make the distinction between good and bad syncretism. Syncretism is "good" where there is a true encounter between the Gospel and culture, leading to dialogue on a continuing basis, similar to the dialogue I have illustrated in the latter part of this thesis. A true depth encounter will reveal Christ present in that culture so that people know that Christ has visited them "at home." A true dialogue will maintain the universal challenge of the Christian message. Syncretism can be "bad" where the encounter is superficial, where there is an
independence and a closing in upon itself, so that the dialogue ceases, and the universal challenge is not maintained. Throughout this thesis I have endeavored to achieve a "good" syncretism in a depth encounter with a continuing dialogue and an unresolved tension between Gospel and culture. Furthermore, I think the complexities encountered in this study must caution against premature judgement on the outcome of the tension. An outsider may all too easily misinterpret elements of the local culture. Besides, one must keep orthodoxy within a perspective. What Christians "do" (orthopraxis) is also very important for understanding who Christians are. Hence it may be important to see what people "do" with a local theology before coming to a conclusion as to whether it is good or bad syncretism.

In the Introduction I told a story about the Hopi Indians, the unmasking of the Kachina gods, their subsequent disenchantment, and the religious questions which this raised. In this thesis I have faced questions related to the "stories" of a New Guinea people, the "unmasking" of one story in particular, and I have sought how it might be appropriated in new ways; ways which do not negate the profound religious questions; ways which allow it to function as a symbol and mediator of the sacred, giving access to new realities; ways which move from disenchantment to re-enchantment. Shea puts it well.

But, however painful the path of disenchantment, it is, in the last analysis, a positive and maturing experience. It is more an experience of discovery than loss. It is the retrieval of the true relationship between Mystery and finite human reality.
NOTES
Notes to INTRODUCTION


3. Schreiter calls this "an historical approach with an essentialist ideology . . . The onion becomes a better metaphor for history than the walnut; one peels away historical contingencies with the same risk as one peels an onion. Historical truth is given with historical contingency." ("Constructing Local Theologies," p. 82). The approach, sometimes called a "translation model" seeks to adapt a kernel of Christian truth wrapped in cultural expressions. It tries to work around the cultural question whereas with local theology culture is itself part of the process by which a theology is formed.


5. Ibid., p. 52. There is a commonly held misunderstanding that contemporary humankind has outgrown myths. I will show further on in this thesis that science has not displaced myth, but has clarified its role within human consciousness. The scientific imagination has generated new myths which influence the values, attitudes and beliefs of people today.


Notes to CHAPTER I

1. This description of myth is based on that from P. Cohen, "Theories of Myth," Man 4 (1969): 335. "A Myth is a narrative of events; the narrative has a sacred quality; the sacred communication is made in a symbolic form; at least some of the events and objects which occur in the myth neither occur nor exist in the world other than that of myth itself; and the narrative refers in dramatic form to origins or transformations."

2. Principal of Freud's works is Totem and Taboo (Subtitle: Some Points of agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics." Trans. J. Strachey (New York: Norton and Co., 1950). (Originally published in German in 1918.) Freud's work did not have immediate influence. Ruth Benedict in her early works owed little to Freudian concepts. For instance she picked up the contrast between Dionysian and Apollinarian psychological types from Nietzsche's study of Greek drama, The Birth of Tragedy.

3. Coming of Age in Samoa (1928) (Subtitle: A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization); Growing up in New Guinea (1930); Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (1935).


5. An example is Clifford Geertz's "thick description" (from Gilbert Ryle) which notes not just actions as such, but their meaning as well. See The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 5-10.


8. Another approach to culture which I have not described in the text is the "ecological" approach, which looks especially to the environment as a limiting or enabling factor in culture history. See Roy Rappaport's Pigs for the Ancestors (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) which is a study of the relationship between pig-slaughtering festivals, secondary growth, pig production, the human and pig populations and warfare among the Maring of New Guinea.

Notes to CHAPTER I (cont.)

Passage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). (First published in French, 1909.)

10. In The Forest of Symbols (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 19, Turner gives a fuller definition of symbol which he takes from The Concise Oxford Dictionary. A "symbol" is a thing regarded by general consent as naturally typifying or representing or recalling something by possession of analogous qualities or by association in fact or thought.


13. A good example of this is Turner's discussion in The Forest of Symbols, p. 28, of the way the milk tree can mean: women's breasts, motherhood, a novice at Nkang'a, the principle of matriliney, a specific matrilineage, learning, and the unity and persistence of Ndembu society.


15. Ibid.


17. Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors, p. 270.

18. Ibid., p. 298.

19. C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, p. 29.

20. Ibid., p. 144.

21. Geertz says a significant symbol is "anything that is disengaged from its mere actuality and used to impose meaning upon experience." (Ibid., p. 45.) A myth may be considered a system of significant symbols (Ibid., p. 48).

22. Semiotics is the science of signs and the communication of meaning by means of signs (or symbols). The term comes from Saussure who showed the sign to be made up of two parts: the signifier (sign-vehicle) and the signified (concept). See his Course in General
Notes to CHAPTER I (cont.)


The nervous system provides a complex circuitry which deals with information or digestible bits of meaning. The circuitry allows for input into the system, for the processing and storage of the input, the relating of the input to previous inputs, for sending information to various parts of the organism and receiving requests for varying amounts of information.


24. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, p. 452. In another place he writes, "Doing ethnology is like trying to read (in the sense of 'construct a reading of') a manuscript--foreign, faded, full of ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and tendentious commentaries, but written not in conventionalized graphs of sound but in transient examples of shaped behavior." (Ibid., p. 10.)

25. Ibid., p. 20.

26. Ibid., p. 25.

27. Ibid., p. 11.

28. Ibid., p. 17.

29. Ibid., p. 448.

30. Ibid., p. 30.


33. This distinction is very similar to Chomsky's distinction between competence and performance.

34. For instance, the syntagmatic structure in my previous example: "The Lamb of God takes away our sins," would be: article + noun + possessive article + noun + compound verb + possessive pronoun + noun.

35. The phoneme—the smallest unit of language to carry meaning, is tested in a "minimal pair" to see if alternation makes a difference. Sound differences which do not carry a change in meaning are variations on a phoneme: called allophones.


39. Lévi-Strauss appears to use the terms "savage thought" and "mythical thought" interdependently. See *The Savage Mind*, pp. 16ff.


41. Ibid., p. 22.


47. My subject here in this study is the myth analysis of Claude Lévi-Strauss. Some other researchers in this area should be noted. In his *Morphology of the Folktale* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975) (originally in Russian, 1928), Vladimir Propp focuses on the functions of the actors in a tale. The structure of the text is described following the chronological order of the linear sequence of elements in the text. A.J. Greimas and F. Rastier in "The Interaction of semiotic constraints," *Yale French Studies* 41 (1968): 86-105, accept much from Lévi-Strauss, but pay more attention to "actants" and their roles. E. and P. Maranda in *Structural Models in Folklore and Transformational Essays* offer a refinement of the process of mediation in folklore materials.
Notes to CHAPTER I (cont.)


50. In *Structural Anthropology*, vol. 1, p. 211, he says that it must be at this higher level, or myth would become confused with any other kind of speech.


52. Ibid., p. 224.

53. Ibid. He sets it out in an example as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INITIAL PAIR</th>
<th>FIRST TRIAD</th>
<th>SECOND TRIAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Herbivorous animals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Carrion-eating animals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunting</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beasts of prey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warfare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


56. For a discussion of this pertaining to the Asdiwal Tale, see K. Burridge, "Lévi-Strauss and Myth," in Leach (ed.), *The Structural Study of Myth and Totemism*, pp. 91-115.


59. For an excellent appreciation and critique of Lévi-Strauss, see E. Leach, *claude lévi-strauss*.

60. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, p. 358.

61. Ibid., p. 126.
Notes to CHAPTER I (cont.)


65. Ibid., p. 59.


70. Ibid., p. 140.


Notes to CHAPTER II

1. Ricoeur's thought is very wide ranging as is noted in D.M. Rasmussen, *Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 3. "Like the symbol, Ricoeur's thought is multivalent. Consequently this interpretation cannot bring together all the facets, all the meanings of this prolific writer." I cannot fully represent Ricoeur's thought either, but I will give my interpretation of some important points after reading some of his basic works. His concern for structuralism has developed principally in his more recent writings concerned with the philosophy of language. I shall point to some areas where his recent thinking contrasts with his previous work.


4. According to Ricoeur, the exclusive use of structural analysis treats it as a philosophy or ideology rather than a method.


9. In "Structure and Hermeneutics," in *Conflict of Interpretations*, Ricoeur sets out two major limits of Lévi-Strauss's structuralism. Firstly Lévi-Strauss uses examples (from totemic societies) which are exceptions rather than examples. Secondly, structuralism is a scientific method, not a philosophy.


11. Ibid.

13. Ricoeur says that in the thought of men like Freud, Marx and Nietzsche, a reflection is directed initially toward a fundamental illusion, a false consciousness which requires a solution in terms of demystification. He labels this a hermeneutics of suspicion which is the contrary of the phenomenology of the sacred.


15. Lévi-Strauss attributes the difference to the object of knowledge. "... we are led toward a completely different view--namely, that the kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and that the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of the things to which it is applied." Structural Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 230.

16. With recent work in the sociology of science it has been shown that science too rests upon mythic foundations. See T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

17. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 40.


19. This explanation of mythic-symbolic language does not come directly from Ricoeur, but from Rasmussen's interpretation of his writing.


22. Ricoeur in Rasmussen, p. 136.

23. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 3.

24. Ibid., p. 8.

25. Ibid., p. 12.

26. He defines semantics as "the theory that relates the inner or immanent constitution of the sense to the outer or transcendent intention of the reference." Ibid., p. 22.


28. Ibid., p. 534.
29. Ibid., p. 536.

30. This is an important insight in the theory of interpretation. Consider for instance how scholars over the centuries have made valid use of the Epistle to the Hebrews thinking (incorrectly) the author to be the Apostle Paul.


32. Prominent in this respect are the hermeneutics of Troeltsch, Schleiermacher and Dilthey who give priority to the author's intention and to the original audience. Ricoeur has been influenced by the antihistoricist writings of Frege and Husserl. For further discussion on this topic, see Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, pp. 89-91.

33. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 77.

34. Following Ricoeur, I have been helped here by E.D. Hirsch, in Validity in Interpretation (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967).

35. Note the difference between "validation" and "verification." The former shows that a conclusion is probably true on the basis of what is known. The latter suggest direct empirical confirmation and certainty.

36. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 81.


38. Ibid., p. 146.

39. Ibid., p. 150.

40. Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, p. 305.

41. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 78.


43. Ibid., p. 39.

44. For discussion on these three modalities, see Freud and Philosophy, p. 14.

45. I am not satisfied with Ricoeur's treatment of oneiric symbolism. It is unfortunate that he has given so much attention to Freud and almost none to Jung. I will comment on this at greater length at the end of this section (p. 37).
Notes to CHAPTER II (cont.)

46. Ricoeur uses Eliade's works as an example here, in The Symbolism of Evil, p. 353.


48. Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, p. 310.


50. Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, p. 65.

51. His material here is drawn from Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. See Freud and Philosophy, p. 506ff.

52. The argument here can be found in Freud and Philosophy, p. 459ff. As an illustration he uses the expression from Freud, "Where id was, there ego shall be."

53. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, pp. 496-97.

54. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 46.

55. Ricoeur, Semeia 4, p. 86.

56. Ibid., p. 77.

57. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 52.

58. Ibid., p. 62.

59. Ibid., p. 69.


63. Ibid.

64. This argument is developed in Semeia 4, p. 88, and Interpretation Theory, p. 68, and throughout Philosophy Today 21.

65. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 64.

66. Ibid., p. 65.


69. Carl Jung, *Man and his Symbols*, p. 32. He writes, "They [dream images] are not in any sense lifeless or meaningless 'remnants.' They still function, and they are especially valuable . . . just because of their 'historical' nature. They form a bridge between the ways in which we consciously express our thoughts and a more primitive, more colorful and pictorial form of expression." He adds, "These dream images are called 'archaic remnants' by Freud; the phrase suggests that they are psychic elements surviving in the human mind from ages long ago. This point of view is characteristic of those who regard the unconscious as a mere appendix of consciousness (or, more picturesquely, as a trash can that collects all the refuse of the conscious mind).

Further investigation suggested to me that this attitude is untenable and should be discarded."

Note also: Lévi-Strauss does not think Jung goes far enough. Criticizing Jung's idea of the archetype in *Structural Anthropology*, vol. 1, pp. 208-09, he says that symbolic meanings should be totally relative (something which Lévi-Strauss himself goes against in his comparative *Mythologiques*).


Notes to CHAPTER III

1. The myth of Kaunala Tape was chanted for me by Kale of Porgera, in the Enga Province of Papua New Guinea, in January, 1974. It was transcribed in the Ipili language from a tape, and translated into Melanesian Pidgin by Nandewa Alemba of Porgera. My translation from Pidgin into English appeared first in Appendix A of "Ipili Religion Past and Present" (Diploma in Anthropology Thesis, University of Sydney, 1975).

Following E. Leach in Culture and Communication (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976) I understand that there is an intrinsic prior relationship between the message bearing entity and the message in a "sign," while there is no intrinsic prior relationship with a "symbol." It may be difficult for the reader unfamiliar with the content of the myth to distinguish signs from symbols. While some words and phrases may seem to have no prior intrinsic relationship in English, this may not be the case for one familiar with the semantics of the vernacular. For instance, hair (15): its thickness and healthy appearance, is important as a sign of masculinity. Men, after initiation, may wear large moon-shaped human-hair wigs. Also it might be helpful to point out that it is normal for grown men to have a special place reserved for them (15) on one side of a woman's house. The Hewa, who figure in most Ipili mythology, are neighbors of the Ipili people. They live down in the lower reaches of the Yongope and Lagaip rivers. Among the Ipili, they have a reputation for their cannibalistic customs. Hence it is not surprising that they should want to eat Tapeyo (22) when he is brought to them in a net bag (the customary way to carry a baby). In some cases it is not so easy to distinguish sign and symbol. For example, the Hewa territory (known simply as "the Hewa") is the end of the known world for the Ipili, and so may be a symbol of the unknown.


5. I lived nine months with the Ipili and during that time learned to understand the language at the level of elementary conversation.

6. Terrence Borchard, "Ipili Language Manual," p. 66. (Typewritten.) (The page numbering in my copy is different from the original.)


8. In my own research I found both the terms ati kenga (above world) and tawe toko (raised place). I use the former as it is used in Biersack's report, "Religion and Society," Papua New Guinea, January 1977 (typewritten). I am indebted to Biersack for many linguistic details and her insights generally into Ipili thought.

9. The steep mountains rise to over 12,000 ft. The river gorge in the Porgera Valley is approximately 4,500 ft., and in the Paiela Valley approximately 3,500 ft. above sea level.

10. Tombo can be thought of as dividing a unity or combining a duality such as a river dividing territorial space, a line of bushes dividing a garden, or a belt dividing the halves of a person.

11. These symbolic categories are supported by native dream interpretation. For example, dreams about one going down into the river valley are usually interpreted as a sign of future misfortune; possibly that one will die. To dream of walking in a cold place among Pandanus trees is to know that one will live for a long time.

12. For further details of descent, kinship and male-female relations, see my "Ipili Religion Past and Present" (Thesis for Diploma in Anthropology, University of Sydney, 1975). See also, Aletta Biersack, "Field Report No. 2," Papua New Guinea, 1976 (typewritten), and "Religion and Society."

13. Exchange relations are organized on the reciprocity of kinship. Two brothers like Kaunala Tape and Auwala share the same lines and are therefore socially indistinct and so do not enter into social exchange relations.


15. Iputime is possibly defined as "male" when Kaunala Tape borrows a bow and arrows from her (14).

16. Kepele is a traditional ritual where the ancestral spirits are recipients. For further details see my "Kepele: A Ritual from the Western Highlands of Papua New Guinea," Anthropos (1978) (Forthcoming).
Notes to CHAPTER III (cont.)

17. Adultery and stealing are regarded as wrong because they are hidden and do not produce socially observable results. (Biersack, "Field Report No. 2," p. 10.)


19. Jung writes, "I have made several comparisons . . . between modern and primitive man. Such comparisons, . . . are essential to an understanding of the symbol-making propensity of man, and of the part that dreams play in expressing them. For one finds that many dreams present images and associations that are analogous to primitive ideas, myths, and rites." (Man and his Symbols, p. 32.) Also, "Primitive tribal lore is concerned with archetypes that have been modified in a special way. They are no longer contents of the unconscious, but have already been changed into conscious formulae taught according to tradition." ("Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious," Collected Works, ed.s Read, Fordham and Adler (New York: Pantheon, 1953) vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 5.

20. This deals with the same question as that posed by Ricoeur in Conflict of Interpretations, p. 324, "How does a man emerge from his childhood, how does he become an adult?" He is dealing with the problems of consciousness.


22. See Jung, Man and his Symbols, pp. 111, 146, 150.


25. See Jung, Man and his Symbols, pp. 207, 211, 230, 238.

26. With "undifferentiated consciousness" one is not aware of an unconscious dimension of the self and consequently has no control over it.


28. One mina is usually made up of a "real" pair opposed to an "irreal" thing. Cosmic mina, pairing real and irreal things exhaust the possibilities of relationships and are cosmic for this reason. For more on this, see Biersack, "Technical Report," p. 5.
29. Some light may be shed on the puzzle of Kaunala Tape and his varying sexual identification by noting that he takes on the opposing roles in relation to the person in question (the Hewa woman, his brother, Iputime).

![Diagram]

The general movement is from "irreal" (child or young man) to the "real" (man).

30. The laws of association here are those of metonym in syntagmatic chains and metaphor in paradigmatic associations.

31. Strictly speaking one should include variants of the myth. I have not done so because the myth is long and I have limited space, and because the few variants I collected are of varying quality.

32. It should also be noted that this myth follows the separation--transition--incorporation pattern of Van Gennep, also used by Victor Turner. Episode I is the separation phase (symbolized in the separation from his brother). Episodes II-V are the transitional phases. Episodes VI-VIII are those of incorporation. See Arnold Van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972) (Published originally in French, 1909). Also, Victor Turner, The Forest of Symbols, pp. 93-94.


34. I mention this to counter Geertz's criticism of the abstractness of structural analysis as "experimental mind reading." See conclusion to Chapter I. The "logic of actual life" is Geertz's own phrase.
Notes to CHAPTER IV


5. The main difference in the two articles are the preamble on functionалиsts and symbolists at the beginning of the "Garden of Eden" paper, and consideration of Genesis material beyond Chapter 4, at the end of the "Genesis as Myth" paper.


7. As examples of symbolic interpretations he cites Frazer, Freud and medieval artists.


9. The figure is from Genesis as Myth, p. 20.

10. In Genesis as Myth, p. 22, Leach says, "I have concentrated here upon the issue of sexual rules and transgressions so as to show how a multiplicity of repetitions, inversions and variations can add up to a consistent 'message.' I do not wish to imply that this is the only structural pattern which these myths contain."

12. Ibid., p. 395.


20. A further example of the way critical studies can contribute to understanding is the way they ascribe man's creation in the image of God, and from the dust of the earth, to different traditions. The difference is unexplained in Freilich, "Myth, Method, and Madness," p. 215. On the other hand, structural analysis helps shed light on the puzzle of why in Gen. 2:9, the tree of life is mentioned along with the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Yet Adam and Eve are forbidden to eat the fruit only of the latter, and therefore could have eaten the fruit of the tree of life with impunity and gained immortality. The tree of life is absent from most of the narrative until Gen. 3:22, when God drives the couple from the Garden of Eden in order to prevent them from eating its fruit. See Rogerson, "Structural Anthropology and the Old Testament," p. 498.


the structure of Gen. 1-11 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 - 3</th>
<th>6 - 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>creation</td>
<td>flood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blessing</td>
<td>blessing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effective</td>
<td>effective in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>through time</td>
<td>expansion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Narrative form (creation and flood are in complementary relationship)

Enumerative form


24. For example, the Gilgamesh Epic relates how Gilgamesh, a legendary king from Sumerian times, tried to find the secret of immortality from the hero of the flood, Utnapishtim. Utnapishtim built a large boat, filled it with all living things and rode out the flood. See J.P. Prichard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1950), pp. 93-97.

25. For example, the story has affinities with the Babylonian myth of *Enuma Elish*. See Prichard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts*, pp. 60-72. For a comment on the differences between the *Enuma Elish* and the Genesis account of creation, see Don Ihde, *Hermeneutic Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 116, 120.

26. There is a trace of the conflict that appears in classical form in the *Enuma Elish* epic, recognizable in Gen. 1:2. The word for deep, "tehom," is a distant reminder of Tiamat the primordial monster.


28. Vawter (p. 51) says that the earlier arrangement was first disturbed by the introduction of the account of the creation of Man along with the dietary rule of v. 29. Then to redress the balance of the original outline, the dietary rule was extended to the animals as well and the whole was anticipated by the rather anomalous appearance of the plants in vv. 11-12 of the third day.

29. Vawter (p. 46) attributes the pairs the author's "own idiosyncrasies which do not necessarily have a lasting theological import." I think they have more import than he would allow.

30. There is debate over the proper understanding of "image." The word used, "selem," usually means a forbidden image or idol. Vawter (p. 57) suggests that the likeliness may be in having dominion over all the other creatures.
31. In Gen. 2:10-14 there is an addition of geographical details which were probably put in for their demythologizing effect.

32. "Of Eden," is a secondary addition. The objective feminine pronoun "it" goes with the original "land," but not with "garden," which is masculine.


34. Westermann, Creation, p. 20.

35. This is discussed in Leach, Genesis as Myth, p. 22. He notes on p. 8 that this is why it is necessary to have the four gospels which tell the same yet a different story.


37. Westermann, Creation, p. 121.

38. Forming a woman from a man's bone would probably not seem too far-fetched to Ipili who believe that the man gives the hard bony parts to a child.

Note also, the addition of two creation events to make eight in the six days of creation would seem to make sense also, with eight being the ideal number in Ipili kinship.

39. Westermann, Creation, p. 47, points out how the question "Where are you," is directed not so much to Adam's whereabouts as to his being; almost like the colloquial, "Where are you at?" It is directed at Adam who is trying to avoid being seen for who he is.


41. Cited in Irenaeus, ibid., p. 150.


43. See A. Van Gennep, Rites of Passage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972) (Published originally in French, 1909). See also, various works by Victor Turner.

44. I note with interest J.L. Connor's comment in "Original Sin: Contemporary Approaches," Theological Studies 29 (1968): 240, ". . . despite a passing reference here and there, little work seems to have been done in the area of depth psychology. Grelot mentions Ricoeur and his importance for this field [original sin] but never
returns to the subject. It would be interesting to see a study on the topic for the light it might shed on our self-understanding in original sin."


Notes to CONCLUSION

1. The commentary was an accepted form of theology prior to the Middle Ages. Before Abelard, theology was known as *sacra pagina*. The Twelfth and Thirteenth Century masters looked first at grammatical construction and then at the *allegoria*: parable, metaphor, prophesy, etc. They then passed from the literal sense to the spiritual. Thomas Aquinas insisted that the spiritual sense be used for edification only and not for proof.


3. The "local" yet "universal" tension is apparent already in *Acts*, with the admittance of Gentiles to the Christian community.

4. It may be seen that this is as much a problem for the "older" churches as it is for the young ones.

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